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ABSTRACT
As latecomers to global business competition, emerging-market multinational companies
(EMNCs) utilize cross-border merger and acquisitions to swiftly acquire strategic assets, such as
brands and distribution channels, compensating for their competency deficiency. Developed
markets with well-established firms and well-developed market-supporting institutions become
important destinations for EMNCs’ strategic asset-seeking investments. Institutional distance,
national differences in the institutional environment, constitutes a major source of competitive
disadvantage for foreign firms competing with indigenous firms. Foreign firms need to overcome
the challenges of unfamiliarity, relational, and discriminatory hazards to establish legitimacy in
the host market. Compared to established multinationals that originate from other advanced
markets (AMNCs), EMNCs potentially face additional legitimacy threats derived from their
countries of origin. Facing large institutional distance, AMNCs are likely to take less ownership
to rely on a local firm’s legitimacy, but EMNCs may lack the opportunity to find a willing local
partner. The findings of the current study generally support that the negative association between
institutional distance and ownership position is less apparent for EMNCs than for AMNCs.
Furthermore, not all emerging markets are homogeneous in their country development. EMNCs,
originating from countries with higher levels of human capital development and global
connectedness are less impacted by institutional distance in their ownership strategy. The
findings of the current study also suggest EMNCs’ firm level characteristics have minimal
effects in alleviating the influence of institutional distance on their ownership decisions.
Additionally, controlling for institutional distance, I find that EMNCs with a higher level of
ownership position experience better sales growth in subsequent years.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, due to the rapid growth of emerging economies, emerging market
multinational companies (EMNCs) have become important players in global business (Guillen &
Garcia-Canal, 2009). Despite the global economic downturn, foreign direct investment (FDI)
from emerging economies accounted for 25% of the world FDI in 2009, up from 19% in 2008
(UNCTAD, 2010). Some of these emerging economies have become major investors; for
instance, China, Hong Kong (China), and the Russian Federation, have become three of the top
twenty investors in the world (UNCTAD, 2010). The majority of international research
examining emerging economies has been focused on FDI into those countries (e.g., Hoskisson,
Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008). Given the rising trend of outbound FDI
from emerging economies, research examining EMNCs is particularly timely, relevant, and
important (Mathews, 2006; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005).
Due to their unique home market characteristics, EMNCs demonstrate very different
patterns of internationalization than multinational firms that originated in advanced markets1
(Mathews, 2002; Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Traditionally, international scholars observed
that firms consider seeking international expansion after they have established a solid foundation
for their business in their home market. For example, the Uppsala model of internationalization
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) depicts that only after firms have gained substantial experience in
their domestic market will they move on to foreign markets which are proximal to their home
market. After they accumulate sufficient international business experience in adjacent markets,
firms subsequently enter other less familiar foreign markets (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).
1

I use the terms advanced market and developed market interchangeably throughout this paper
to refer to EMNCs’ host, developed economies, such as the U.S., Japan, and continental
European countries. Conversely, the terms emerging market and less developed market are used
interchangeably to refer to EMNCs’ home markets.
1

EMNCs, however, do not usually follow the path depicted in the traditional internationalization
model. Because of limited resources in their home countries and latecomer status, EMNCs seek
international expansion at an early stage (Luo, & Tung, 2007). Particularly, the less developed
economy and weak market-supporting institutions in their home countries may limit EMNCs’
opportunities to develop or acquire advanced managerial or technological capabilities in their
home markets (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). Thus, developed markets with well-established
business environments become the ideal locations for EMNCs’ internationalization to enhance
their core competencies (Makino, et al., 2002; Mathews, 2006; Wright, et al., 2005).
To successfully achieve their goals in a developed market, however, EMNCs must
overcome several competitive disadvantages, such as limited resources and lack of international
experience (Mathews, 2006). Employing an institutional theoretical perspective, I analyze an
EMNC’s competitive disadvantage by delineating their organizational legitimacy in a developed
market. Organizational legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Organizational legitimacy is
an especially salient issue in international business settings because multinational corporations
(MNCs) generally face diverse legitimacy requirements from multiple institutional environments
across the globe (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The environmental complexity facing MNCs to
establish and maintain legitimacy in various host markets mainly comes from the institutional
distance between the MNCs’ host and home markets (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Institutional
distance refers to the national differences between two institutional environments (Kostova &
Zaheer, 1999). Based on Scott’s (1995) framework, the institutional environment consists of
three pillars, regulative, cognitive, and normative. The regulative pillar reflects the rules and

2

laws that exist to ensure stability and order in societies; the normative pillar captures societal
values and norms in the institutional field; and the cognitive pillar represents established
cognitive structures and social knowledge shared by people in a given country (Scott, 1995).
EMNCs, compared with other multinational firms, may encounter greater threats to their
status as a legitimate player in a developed market given the three pillars of institutional distance.
First, differences between the emerging market and the advanced market on the regulative pillar
are readily visible. Formal institutions, consisting of formal rules and regulations related to all
sorts of business dealings, are less developed in EMNCs’ home countries (Peng, et al, 2008). For
instance, accounting standards and legal requirements surrounding listing and registration in a
stock market (Karolyi, 1998; Marosi, & Massoud, 2008), and investor protection procedures
(Pagano, Roell, & Zechner, 2002) all differ between emerging and advanced markets. Thus,
EMNCs may find it challenging to establish legitimacy in a developed market if their corporate
practices are not consistent with more rigorous regulations in a developed market. Second, in
regard to the cognitive pillar, historically, developed markets are mainly located in North
America and Western Europe, two areas that share substantial cultural overlap. EMNCs, on the
other hand, are likely to be from other regions (e.g., Asia or Latin America) and will thus be
embedded in different cultures. As such, EMNCs are likely to face substantial cultural
differences, and thus encounter challenges to conform to the institutional pressures reflecting the
cognitive pillar of advanced markets. Third, in terms of the normative pillar of institutional
distance, some common practices among EMNCs are not shared with advanced-market MNCs
(AMNCs), for example, the prevalence of family-owned business groups. Thus, well-established
best practices in the emerging market might be very different from those in the advanced market.

3

To gain legitimacy, EMNCs need to change their accustomed practices to comply with dominant
practices in a developed market.
Given the EMNC’s potential difficulties in establishing legitimacy in a developed market,
I conduct a two-phase study to examine whether EMNCs base their ownership strategy on
legitimacy concerns to expand their operations into developed markets. Determining an
appropriate level of ownership (i.e. the extent of equity investment) in a foreign subsidiary is an
important strategic decision regarding a firm’s international expansion (Delios & Beamish, 1999;
Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Taylor, & Zou, S. 1998). It involves strategic decisions on
important matters such as resource commitment, degree of control, and type of risk (Brouthers,
1995, Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Taylor, & Zou, 1998).
Traditionally, entry mode researchers rely on transaction cost economics (TCE) and emphasize
operational efficiency considerations (Brouthers & Hannart, 2007). TCE assumes information
asymmetry and opportunism among trading parties (Williamson, 1975, 1981). The discussion of
ownership position focuses on the premise that the increase in ownership enhances the extent of
an investing firm’s control, but intensifies its financial risks over the foreign establishment
(Brouthers, 1995; Brouthers & Hannart, 2007; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & Gatignon,
1986). When entering a less familiar foreign market, a foreign investor may opt for lower equity
participation to avoid the risks associated with the greater likelihood of a partnering firm’s
opportunistic behaviors due to environmental uncertainty (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). On the
other hand, without the complete control associated with full ownership, the foreign investor
may face undue risk by working closely with a partnering firm because the partnering firm can
readily attain the foreign investor’s intangible strategic assets through the partnership and
become a major competitor (Brouthers, 1995).

4

Recently, researchers have gone beyond the traditional TCE approach and the associated
assumption of partnering firm’s opportunistic behaviors. Seeking a comprehensive framework to
analyze macro level national differences, researchers have proposed institutional theory as a
promising perspective to advance entry strategy research (Brouthers & Hannart, 2007). For
example, Yiu & Makino (2002) suggest that the choice of entry mode can be viewed as the
consequence of organizational responses to isomorphic pressures arising from a firm’s external
legitimacy requirement in the host market or internal legitimacy concern within the MNC.
Utilizing a sample of 364 Japanese subsidiaries, they find support for the position that legitimacy
requirements in a host market significantly affect firms’ entry mode choices above and beyond
traditional transaction cost considerations (Yiu & Makino, 2002).
In the current context, given the institutional distance between emerging markets and
developed markets, I argue EMNCs’ ownership strategy would be influenced by the legitimacy
threat facing EMNCs. To examine this issue, I conduct a two-phase examination to study
EMNCs’ ownership position in a developed market. Specifically, this study focuses on crossborder merger and acquisition (M&A) events in the United States, an ideal context to study
EMNCs’ internationalization behavior. To compensate for their latecomer disadvantages,
EMNCs have largely utilized M&As to swiftly establish their presence in developed markets
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007). Particularly, the U.S. has had, by far, the highest
frequency of EMNCs’ M&A events of all the advanced markets (Economist, 2011).
In Phase One, I compare and contrast EMNCs’ ownership position in response to
institutional distance with the ownership position of MNCs from other advanced markets
(AMNCs). Basically, I argue that given EMNCs’ unique characteristics, EMNCs will respond to
institutional pressures differently than AMNCs in a developed market. The findings of the
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current study suggest EMNCs are less sensitive to institutional distance than AMNCs. For
instance, facing normative distance, AMNCs are likely to take less ownership, while EMNCs’
ownership position is not influenced by normative distance.
In Phase Two, focusing on EMNCs, I provide a more in-depth examination of the
influence of various home country and firm characteristics on a EMNCs’ ownership position as
well as their post-acquisition firm performance. Influenced by various levels of country
development among emerging markets, EMNCs may have different degrees of legitimacy threat
associated with their country of origin. The country of origin effect has been widely utilized in
marketing literature to study how consumers’ perceptions about a product or brand are biased
based on their perceptions associated with a particular country (Roth & Romeo, 1992). Similarly,
lacking information related to EMNCs, developed market stakeholder may evaluate EMNCs
based on the country level characteristics of their home emerging economies. A stakeholder
refers to “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the
organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46). Because of EMNCs’ latecomer status in global
business competition, EMNCs’ stakeholders in developed markets have less information about
the firm and are likely to evaluate EMNCs based on the stereotypes associated with the country
of origin (Bitektine, 2011). Conversely, the indicators of country development, such as human
capital, may alleviate developed market stakeholders’ negative evaluation and differentiate one
emerging economy from another. The findings of the current study render some support for the
hypothesized relationship between legitimacy and various home market characteristics.
Furthermore, various EMNCs’ firm characteristics, such as international presence and
third-party endorsements, may alleviate the legitimacy threat associated with institutional
distance. For instance, in the current study, I find that media coverage moderates the association
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between normative distance and EMNCs’ ownership position. Finally, I am interested in
assessing the association between EMNCs’ ownership position and subsequent firm
performance. Specifically, I offer a set of competing hypotheses to examine whether higher or
lower ownership position improves EMNCs’ overall firm performance. The results suggest
higher ownership position lead to better sales growth for EMNCs.
In summary, through a multi-phase empirical examination of EMNC’s entry mode in the
U.S., I provide evidence in regard to the influence of institutional distance on EMNCs’
internationalization. Given the rising phenomenon of EMNCs, the findings of this study have
great implications for practitioners to formulate effective strategies to respond to the challenges
facing EMNCs in developed markets. In addition, utilizing institutional theory, I contribute to the
international business literature by comparing EMNCs’ entry mode decisions with other MNCs.
This finding may provide a foundation for a new internationalization theory. Further, despite the
common characteristic of a less developed economy, emerging markets can differ on several
important dimensions. In this study, I differentiate among the levels of institutional constraints
associated with EMNCs’ countries of origin by looking into various home market characteristics,
such as human capital development in an emerging economy.
Moreover, the current study may contribute to institutional theory by expanding the
theory to examine organizational responses under multiple institutional constraints. As
researchers point out, much of the research using institutional theory focuses on institutional
pressure to explain the isomorphism of organizational responses in an institutional field
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). The current study focuses on the firm level and examines
EMNCs’ entry mode decisions in response to competing institutional demands from their
developed host market and developing home market. Facing institutional distance, EMNCs
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behave differently from AMNCs due to EMNCs’ unique characteristics. Further, EMNCs that
originated in the same home country may have different entry mode decisions based on their
unique firm characteristics. As such, the finding of this study aids our understanding of how
organizations respond differently to isomorphic pressures despite being under similar
institutional constraints.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. EMERGING-MARKET MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES (EMNCS)
1. THE HOME BASE OF EMNCS—EMERGING ECONOMIES
Emerging economies are not well defined in the international literature. Part of the
difficulty in classifying a country as emerging market may be due to the rapidly changing
landscape of foreign direct investment (FDI), which involves a firm’s cross-border transfer of
resources by any intra-firm mode, such as joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries
(Dunning, 1998). Just a few decades ago, most FDI originated from the so-called Triad countries,
including the United States, continental European countries, and Japan (UNCTAD, 2006), and
these countries constitute the commonly discussed developed markets. Due to the prevalence of
FDI originated from developed markets, traditional research on FDI activities tracked
multinational corporations (MNCs) from developed markets and their strategies in entering other
developed markets and/or less developed markets (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008).
During the 1960s, MNCs from the so-called Asian tiger economies, including Taiwan,
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, were among the earliest non-traditional MNCs.
Researchers documented this first wave of non-traditional MNCs’ activities as “The New
Multinationals” (Lall, 1983) and “Third World Multinationals” (Wells, 1983). Many of these
countries with rapid industrial growth have been referred to as newly industrialized countries and
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some of them have since graduated to developed economies. For example, South Korea has been
included in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), most of the
members of which are high-income economies with a high Human Development Index (HDI)2
and are considered developed countries. In the last ten years, another group of emerging
economies, including the so-called BRICS countries (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa) are considered to be the next group of newly industrialized economies having the
potential to compete with major economies. The aforementioned groups of rising economies (the
Asian Tigers and BRICS) are exemplar sources of major non-traditional FDI. Other emerging
economies may include so-called Tiger Cubs (i.e. The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and
Malaysia), formerly socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union.
The above brief documentation of the transition of emerging economies suggests as time
changes, various unique characteristics associated with country development are utilized to
classify emerging economies and present difficulty in having a consistent definition of emerging
economies. In practice there is also no universal definition of which countries are considered to
be emerging economies. The World Bank classifies countries into four income groups, using
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita as cutoff values. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) bases their classification of the advanced and emerging economies on three indicators of
country development, including GNI per capita, export diversification and the degree of
integration into the global financial system. UNCTAC, the statistic division of the United Nation,
publishes a series of lists including top 100 non-financial MNCs from developing and transition

2

HDI originated in the annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development
Programme. HDI combines three dimensions, including life expectancy at birth, mean years of
schools and expected years of schooling, and GNI per capita.
9

economies.3 For example, in 2008, 67 firms on the list of top 100 non-financial MNCs were from
Asian economies, including China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand (Table 1). Despite using the term developing economies, UNCTAC,
whose reports are frequently cited in international literature, made an effort to emphasize that the
classification code is only for the convenience of reporting statistics and that there is no
established convention for the classification.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Despite the various classifications, it is agreed that emerging markets are important to the
world economy because of their rapid economic growth (Economist, 2011). In contrast with the
recent sluggish economic growth in the developed markets, less economically developed
countries, mostly in Latin America and Asia, continue to demonstrate impressive economic
growth (UNCTAD, 2006). For example, the U.S. is expected to have economic growth of 2.2
percent in 2012, while several emerging markets are predicted to grow by 15 percent. China, one
of the major emerging economies, is expected to have 8.2 percent growth in GDP (Economist,
2011). Moreover, newly internationalized firms from these less developed economies
increasingly become important players in the global business landscape. Despite the recent
global economic downturn, foreign direct investment (FDI) from emerging economies accounts
for 25% of the world FDI in 2009. The World Investment Report suggests that FDI from
emerging economies will continue to rise (UNCTAD, 2010). Studies tracing the development of
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UNCTAD classifies countries into three groups of development, including developing
economies, transition economies and developed economies. In the current paper, developing and
transition economies are considered as emerging markets in contrast with developed markets.
10

these firms demonstrate the promise of these non-traditional MNCs to become an important
avenue for theorizing or empirical testing (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2008; Luo, & Tung,
2007; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).
Other than rapid economic growth, another distinguishing characteristic of emerging
markets lies in their institutional environment. Institutions consist of “cognitive, normative, and
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott,
1995, p.33). Economists, represented by North (1991), view institutions as consisting of formal
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal restraints (sanctions, taboos, customs,
traditions, code of conduct). Extant economic research has been focused on the evolution of
formal institutions which promote a set of economic rules of the game (with enforcement) that
induce sustained economic growth (Assane, & Grammy, 2003; De Haan, & Lundstrom, 2006;
North, 1991). In ancient hunting and gathering societies, simple forms of economic exchange
were enforced by a dense social network of informal constraints, such as trust and reciprocity. As
trade became more complex, the impersonal contract enforcement through various institutions
became necessary, because personal ties, voluntary constraints, and ostracism were no longer
effective (North, 1991). Similarly, as emerging markets become more competitive in the world
economy, recent research suggests that these emerging markets will experience a transition
process from a “relationship-based, personalized transaction structure to a rule-based, impersonal
exchange structure” (Peng, 2003, p. 275). Along similar lines, other researchers suggest that
emerging markets are characterized by ‘weak’ formal market-supporting institutions, such as
their legal framework and enforcement, property rights, information systems, and regulatory
regimes (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). Whereas market-supporting institutions are
strong in developed markets, weak market-supporting institutions in emerging markets may “fail
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to ensure effective markets or even undermine markets (as in the case of corrupt business
practices)” (Meyer, et al., 2009, p. 63).
In sum, there is no consistent definition of emerging markets in either the academic or
practitioner literature. At the conceptual level, the current study utilizes emerging economy as an
umbrella term to represent countries that experience rapid economic growth, but do not achieve
the maturity of developed markets, particularly in the development of their formal institutions.
For empirical purposes, in Phase One, acquirers’ home countries are classified into emerging
economies and advanced economies based on conventional standards, offered by United Nation
and OECD association. In Phase Two, I rely on several country level characteristics to further
delineate the country-of-origin effects on EMNC’s internationalization behaviors.
2. EMNCS’ INTERNATIONALIZATION MOTIVES
In the current study, I follow Luo & Tung (2007) and define emerging-market
multinational companies (EMNCs) as “international companies that originated from emerging
markets and are engaged in outward FDI, where they exercise effective control and undertake
value-adding activities in one or more foreign countries” (p.482). This definition excludes firms
which are only engaged in the exporting-importing business, and focuses on EMNCs which have
substantial investment in foreign activities and are perceived as having influence in the eyes of
developed market stakeholders. In this section, I will further elaborate EMNCs’ unique
motivation to opt for accelerated internationalization, where traditional asset-exploiting
consideration is secondary to the primary asset-seeking motivation, particularly when EMNCs
enter developed markets.
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Because of their unique home market conditions, EMNCs, considered “new” MNCs, are
following a different path than traditional multinationals from advanced markets (Guillen &
Garcia-Canal, 2009). Traditionally, the internationalization model based on the established
MNCs portrays internationalization as a sequential, learning process. The Uppsala model
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) predicts that after establishing a substantial domestic base of
operation, a firm looks for adjacent areas for expansion. Only when a firm accumulates
substantial international business will a firm seek to enter a less familiar market (Johanson &
Vahlne, 1977). This line of research has shown that psychic distance, measuring managers’
perceptions of cross-national differences, is a powerful predictor of a firm’s foreign target
selection (Benito & Grisprud, 1992; Stottinger & Schlegelmilch, 1998; Whitelock & Jobber,
2004) and entry strategy (Brouthers, 1995; Ellis, 2007). Psychic distance refers to the factors that
prevent a firm understanding of a foreign environment (Nordstrom & Vahlne, 1994). When
managers perceive a large distance between their home country and host location, they are less
likely to pursue the host location as the first foreign entry. In other words, managers’ perceptions
of risk and uncertainty associated with a less familiar market dictate a firm’s internationalization
behavior. EMNCs, however, do not follow the exact trajectory predicted by this sequential
process. Based on a sample of successful firms originating from peripheral countries, including
Thailand, India and Brazil, Bartlett & Ghoshal (2000) reveal that executives of these successful
EMNCs demonstrate two strong qualities: 1) their commitment and confidence in their firms’
ability to compete internationally, even before the company achieves the scale needed for
international expansion, and 2) their willingness to accept new ideas even when those ideas
challenge established practices and core capabilities. As a result, these adventurous business
executives successfully led their firms abroad at an early stage without having established a solid
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foundation in their home markets. Similarly, Bonaglia, Goldstein & Mathews (2007) document
the accelerated internationalization pattern demonstrated by three successful EMNCs in the
home appliance industry, including Haier from China, Mabe from Mexico and Arcelik from
Turkey.
The above discussion suggests that EMNCs differ from traditional, advanced market
multinational companies (AMNCs) in that EMNCs internationalize at an earlier stage than
AMNCs. The expedient internationalization process mainly results from EMNCs’ unique
motivation for expanding overseas. Traditionally, firms seek international expansion to increase
market share or to access low-cost factors of production (e.g. labor, raw material, etc.) (Bartlett,
Ghoshal & Beamish, 2008). Internationalization theories suggest that to compete with
indigenous firms in the host market, a multinational firm needs to have some ownership-specific
advantages (i.e. strategic competencies) to counteract “the liability of foreignness” –a foreign
firm’s cost of doing business abroad compared to an indigenous firm (Zaheer, 1995). Thus,
substantial success in the home market is essential for the firm to be equipped with strategic
competencies to compete abroad. When a firm successfully establishes an overseas operation to
exploit their ownership advantages, the multinational firm can further reap the benefit of
internationalization to enjoy economies of scale or scope (Bartlett, et al. 2008).
The asset-exploitation motive of internationalization is further elaborated in Dunning’s
(1980)

well-established

eclectic

paradigm,

Ownership-Location-Internalization

(OLI)

framework. Dunning (1980) suggests the ownership-specific (O) advantages as the first
condition to be satisfied for a firm to benefit from internationalization. As Dunning (1993) notes,
“These O (i.e. ownership-specific) advantages largely take the form of the privileged possession
of intangible assets as well as those which arise as a result of the common governance of cross-
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border value-added activities. These advantages and the use made of them are assumed to
increase the wealth creating capacity of a firm, and hence the value of its assets” (parenthesis
added, p. 79). Further, location (L) indicates that the distribution of these resources and
capabilities are not evenly allocated across nations and can be specific to one nation or a few
countries. Given these L advantages, when firms perceive it to be in their best interest to
internally govern these advantages rather than transact them in the market place, internalization
by establishing foreign operations is considered to be advantageous. Thus, a traditional view on
internationalization has largely assumed the “exploitation perspective where firms make the most
of their rent-yielding ownership advantages expanding into overseas market” (Gubbi, Aulakh,
Ray, Sarkar & Chittoor, 2010, p. 398).
As international researchers suggest, various motivations for firms’ internationalization
result in different internationalization patterns and one single theory may not adequately explain
all of the international activities (Dunning, 1980). Particularly pertinent to the research on
EMNCs’ early internationalization behavior is the perspective that EMNCs may not possess
firm-specific advantages prior to their pursuit of internationalization (Wood, Khavul, PerezNordtvedt, Prakhya, Dabrowski, Zheng, 2011). At least, they may not possess the traditional
conceptualization of firm-specific advantages, such as advanced technology and managerial
capabilities (Makino, et al., 2002). Since EMNCs are less likely to possess aforementioned firmspecific advantages, the traditionally prescribed motivation of asset-exploitation may not be the
main motivation for EMNCs to expand overseas (Yiu, Lau & Bruton, 2007). Instead of assetexploitation motives, EMNCs may choose to internationalize to seek strategic competencies to
compensate for their latecomer disadvantages (Child & Rodriguez, 2005; Rui & Yip, 2008). For
instance, to offset their competitive disadvantages, Chinese firms are shown to utilize a series of
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cross-border acquisitions of established firms to acquire strategic capabilities (Rui-Yip, 2008). In
addition, by surveying a sample of 328 Taiwanese firms, Makino, Lau, and Yeh (2002) validated
their prediction that EMNCs are motivated to expand abroad for asset-exploiting as well as assetseeking purposes. Specifically, EMNCs are motivated to acquire strategic assets primarily in
developed markets, while gaining additional market share by entering both developed and less
developed countries (Makino, et al, 2002).
The asset-seeking motivation is not completely omitted in the traditional discussion of
internationalization. For example, Dunning (1993) identifies three major motives for MNC’s
international expansion, including seeking of markets, resources, and strategic assets. The first
two motives fit the asset-exploiting argument—by investing in a foreign location, MNCs are
portrayed as increasing market share or reducing production cost, thus achieving scale or scope
economies. For the third motive, seeking strategic assets demonstrates the asset-seeking
argument that MNCs expand overseas to acquire strategic competencies which can be
complementary to the MNC’s competitive advantages (Makino, et al., 2002). Essentially, these
three motives can be applied to explain both AMNCs’ and EMNCs’ international activities.
However, because of their latecomer status, EMNCs are much more motivated to acquire
strategic assets, including traditionally conceptualized strategic assets, such as technology,
marketing and management expertise, as well as other strategic assets, such as brands and
distribution channels (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002).
For instance, building on research developed in the mid-1980s related to outward
expansion by “third world” multinationals (e.g. Lecraw, 1977, 1983; Wells, 1983; Lall, 1983),
Lung & Tung (2007) propose a “springboard” perspective that describes the expedient pattern of
EMNCs’ internationalization. EMNCs are suggested to be less path-dependent and much more
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risk-taking through aggressive M&As than established firms. Basically, due to their latecomer
status, they are much more motivated to “use international expansion as a springboard to acquire
critical resources needed to compete more effectively against their global rivals at home and
abroad and to reduce their vulnerability to institutional and market constraints at home” (Luo &
Tung, 2007, p.484). They further conclude that asset- seeking is one of the major reasons for
EMNCs to expand overseas. Through a systematic use of international expansion, EMNCs seek
various strategic assets to compensate for their competitive disadvantages, the strategic assets
which traditional MNCs are not usually seeking through internationalization, such as brands and
distribution channels (Luo & Tung, 2007).
Other than the strategic asset-seeking motive, researchers discuss additional factors to
motivate EMNCs’ internationalization at an early stage. In some cases, EMNCs may utilize
internationalization to avoid poor institutional environments in their home markets (CuervoCazurra & Genc, 2008; Witt & Lewin, 2007). For example, firms may choose to incorporate in
countries outside their home markets to bypass tariff barriers. In other cases, EMNCs, such as
some Chinese firms, are state-owned enterprises and encouraged by their governments to expand
overseas to acquire the resources needed for the development of their home countries (Deng,
2004). While the above cases suggest some unique EMNC’s motives to venture abroad, in
general, strategic asset-seeking serves as the most compelling reason for EMNCs’ accelerated
internationalization, particularly into developed markets.
3. EMNCS’ COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Given the prevalence of research on EMNC’s motivation for internationalization, less is
known about how EMNCs can succeed in global business competition. A few pioneering studies
utilize cases of successful EMNCs to demonstrate EMNCs are nimble players which have
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flexibility and cost advantages to compete with established giants (Mathews, 2006; Wright et al.,
2005). There has not been a systematic examination of how EMNCs may address their
competitive disadvantages while entering developed markets. In this section, I mainly review
literature of the pioneering studies on EMNCs’ competitive advantages and explicate the urgency
to study EMNCs’ competitive disadvantages in their expansion in developed markets.
A few researchers have suggested that EMNCs possess both market-based and nonmarket based advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011; Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). First,
market-based advantage refers to advantages based on resources developed to compete against
other firms in the industry (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011). EMNCs have advantages in
providing lower cost products as well as in designing products for a niche market, particularly
serving emerging market customers. EMNCs’ cost advantage is mainly derived from the factor
endowment in their home country, such as cheaper labor and raw materials (Sun, Peng, Ren, &
Yan, 2012). Since the 1950’s, lower trading barriers have encouraged foreign direct investment,
and established multinationals have shifted their manufacturing facilities to less developed
countries to capitalize on relatively lower wages. Low labor cost becomes the major locationspecific advantage among these less developed economies (Porter, 1990). Such a locationspecific advantage, however, is readily utilized by other firms which have operations in these
countries, and does not constitute an EMNC’s unique competitive advantage over their
developed-market counterparts. Built upon the location-specific advantage of low production
cost, EMNCs primarily propel their growth through innovation which focuses on the unique
needs of the emerging economies (Mathews, 2006). The Tata Nano, a small car with a sale price
of around 4,000 U.S. dollars, is a great example of this type of innovation. Similarly, Mathews
(2006) studied dragon multinationals, successful firms originating from Asian countries, and
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showed that Pacific Asian firms appear to be nimble, competitive players, finding niche markets
or innovative ways to complement the incumbent multinational giants’ strategies (Mathews,
2006).
In combining their cost advantage and their local knowledge of serving emerging market
customers, EMNCs can build their competitive advantage by utilizing existing technology or
business models previously developed by AMNCs to design innovative, affordable products.
Indeed, several researchers document that successful EMNCs build their competitive advantage
by utilizing their connections and linkages with AMNCs (Mathews, 2006; Wright, et al., 2005;
Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Mathews (2006)’s Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL)
framework further elaborated EMNCs’ competitive advantage of leveraging connections. Based
on his finding that dragon multinationals did not depend on their ownership advantage for
international expansion, Mathews (2006) revised Dunning’s (1980) Ownership-LocationInternalization (OLI) framework. By establishing linkages (L) with AMNCs through partnership
or acquisition, dragon multinationals developed their competitive competences by leveraging (L)
the connections associated with AMNCs. Through the leveraging experience, dragon
multinationals learned (L) how to compete with AMNCs by replicating the success of linkage
and leverage. For instance, Ispat, the world’s largest steel producer, started as a small steel
producer in Indonesia. Ispat expanded their overseas business by following its major client, GM,
to establish their foreign operations in different parts of the world (Mathews, 2006). Originating
from Taiwan as a PC assembler, Acer also accelerated its internationalization through a series of
acquisitions and partnerships with established firms in various target markets and became one of
the most successful PC components, PC, and IT firms in the world (Mathews, 2006). The above
two examples, along with other successful cases, suggest that EMNCs, lacking traditionally
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conceptualized ownership advantages, can still successfully venture abroad by utilizing their
connections with AMNCs. By leveraging the connections of the established firms, EMNCs are
standing on the shoulders of giants to achieve further development, making accelerated
internationalization possible.
Second, non-market advantages refer to advantages based on resources developed by the
firm to operate in a country’s institutional environment (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011). Early
international research studying emerging economies has been focused on the inward FDI to these
countries (e.g. Hoskisson, et al., 2000; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). The research agenda was to
understand how firms from developed markets may operate successfully in emerging economies
to enjoy economies of scale or scope. Emerging economies were characterized as low in
environmental munificence and high in environmental uncertainty because of a less developed
economy and institutions. Institutions have been described as the “rules of the game” (North,
1990). Without fully developed, formal market-supporting institutions, there are not many clear
rules to follow in doing business. Thus, for a foreign firm to be successful in an emerging
economy, the firm would need to master navigating the informal institutions, and deal with the
uncertainty associated with changing regulations and governmental interventions (Hoskisson, et
al., 2000).
In contrast with the AMNCs’ potential disadvantage of lacking the capacity to deal with
the aforementioned uncertain institutional environment, EMNCs may be in an advantageous
position because they have the experience to cope with such uncertainty in their home markets.
Recent studies generally support that EMNCs have better firm performance in other less
developed markets than do established MNCs, because EMNCs are skillful in dealing with an
unstable, uncertain institutional environment (Guillen, & Garcia-Canal, 2009; Wright,
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Filatotchey, et al., 2005). Indeed, given the uncertainty associated with unstable institutional
rules, EMNCs need to be equipped with great strategic flexibility to be able to excel in their
home markets (Wright et al., 2005). Thus, successful EMNCs are credited as institutional
entrepreneurs who can adapt easily to changing institutional rules (Caves, 1996; Lall, 1983;
Lecraw, 1993).
Compared to the EMNC’s ability to utilize their connections with AMNCs to create
market-based advantages, EMNCs can also develop non-market based advantages by building
network-ties with business groups (Wright, et al., 2005). Some researchers suggest that in a less
developed institutional environment, informal networks substitute for formal institutions and
reduce the environmental uncertainty associated with changing institutional rules (Gullien,
2000). EMNCs, originating from less developed market-supporting institutions, sustain their
competitive advantage by forming business groups which constitute informal ties across different
industries (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Thus, diversified business groups, a prevailing form
of organization in emerging economies, are believed to be substitutes for the imperfect product,
capital, and labor market in the emerging market (Leff, 1978; Guillien, 2000). Further, EMNCs
that have affiliations with business groups usually perform better than other independent firms in
emerging markets (Gullien, 2000).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 2 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 2 summarizes the aforementioned preliminary research on EMNC’s competitive
advantage. Relatively limited research, however, probes their competitive disadvantages,
particularly when their host location is in a developed market. Given the high economic growth
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rate, emerging markets are viewed as attractive locations for established MNCs from advanced
markets (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). For some EMNCs, to survive domestically, they must
compete effectively with established MNCs. Thus, a majority of EMNCs consider their
investment in advanced markets as an important means to seek more sophisticated marketing,
managerial and technological capabilities as well as brands and distribution channels (Luo &
Tung, 2007; Makino, et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2005). To successfully achieve their strategic
goals in developed markets, EMNCs, however, need to overcome their competitive
disadvantages, such as limited resources and less international experience (Mathews, 2006), not
to mention that EMNCs may not be able to utilize their non-market advantages, which are useful
in a nation with similar institutional environments to their home country (Cuervo-Cazurra, &
Genc, 2008; Wan, 2005). Despite the importance of such a research inquiry, little existing
research provides a systematic examination of EMNCs’ competitive disadvantages, particularly
in developed markets. In the following section, I will further delineate EMNCs’ competitive
disadvantages in a developed market through the lens of organizational legitimacy.
B. EMNCs’ COMPETITIVE DISTADVANTAGES— CHALLENGES IN
ESTABLISHING LEGITIMACY IN A DEVELOPED MARKET
1. ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND INSITITUTIONAL DISTANCE
A fundamental premise of institutional theory is that organizations which are isomorphic
to their institutional fields have a greater chance of survival because such conformity grants the
organizations political power and institutional legitimacy to exist (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
According to earlier work in sociology, organizational legitimacy refers to the congruence
between the organizational values implied by the firms’ activities and the social values of the
environment which these organizations are in (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). In other words, firms
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may choose to adopt specific business activities to conform to socially-constructed value systems
so that they may gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1995).
Suchman’s (1995) seminal work on legitimacy clearly portrays sources of legitimacy and
proposes that to secure different types of legitimacy, organizations need to adopt various
strategies, such as co-opting constituents, offering symbolic displays and professionalizing
operations. Various researchers apply institutional theory and suggest that firms’ activities to
enhance legitimacy are critical to their survival and success (e.g. Cohen & Dean, 2005; Elsbach,
1994; Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2001). For example, by analyzing a sample of central banks,
Deephouse (1996) found support for the central premise of institutional theory—organizational
isomorphism increases organizational legitimacy. The results show that controlling for
organizational age, size and performance, the banks’ isomorphism in their strategies increases
the legitimacy conferred by bank regulators and the media (Deephouse, 1996). Further, drawing
on a sample of U.S. firms, Cohen & Dean (2005) find that the characteristics of top management
teams can be a signal of a firm’s legitimacy, thus increasing the firm’s values in initial public
offerings (IPO).
Organizational legitimacy is an especially salient issue in the international context
because MNCs are faced with diverse legitimacy requirements from multiple institutional
environments across the globe. Notably, Kostova & Zaheer (1999) develop an influential model
delineating the complexity of organizational legitimacy in the context of multinational firms.
They propose that “MNCs face at least as many different institutional environments as the
number of countries in which they operate, since institutions tend to be country specific”
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p.68). Further, they propose that the environmental complexity that
MNCs face when establishing or trying to maintain their legitimacy in their host markets mainly
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comes from the institutional distance between the host and home markets. The three pillars of
institutional distance illustrate the different types of conformity needed to gain legitimacy. The
regulative pillar of institutional pressure emphasizes conformity to rules and is enforced by the
isomorphism mechanism of coercion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). The normative
pillar stresses a deeper, moral base for assessing organizational legitimacy, which is established
through normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). The cognitive pillar
of institutional pressure views organizational legitimacy as the organizations’ activities
congruent with the shared cognitive structure in a society, and this type of conformity is
represented by mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). These three
pillars of institutional environment thus exert qualitatively different pressures for organizational
conformity. For example, the regulative pillar of the institutional environment consists of explicit
rules and regulations, so the institutional pressure from the regulative pillar is easier for foreign
organizations to understand, compared with the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional
pressure.
Existing empirical work illustrates the importance of analyzing legitimacy along the three
pillars of national institutional distance (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004). For
instance, studying a U.S. based MNC’s implementation of quality management practices,
Kostova and Roth (2002) find that the institutional profile of the host country (i.e. three pillars of
institutional environments, Kostova, 1997) influences the foreign subsidiary’s decision in
adopting quality management practices. Their results demonstrate that even with strong and
consistent support for the practice from the parent organization, subsidiary firms will implement
the practice only to varying degrees. Basically, if a given practice is consistent with the cognitive
pillar of the institutional field in the host market, then the subsidiary is more likely to implement
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such a practice (Kostova & Roth, 2002). This result also demonstrates that foreign subsidiaries
will strategically respond to pressures from the institutional fields in the host market in an effort
to gain legitimacy in the host market.
A note is warranted when discussing different institutional environments. The previous
discussion related to the three pillars of the institutional environment is based on Scott’s (1995)
framework and widely accepted by neoinstitutional sociologists. Neoinstitutional economists,
represented by North (1991), conceptualize the institutional environment based on two types of
institutions, formal and informal institutions, instead of the three pillars of institutional
environment. North (1991) defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic and social interactions.” He views institutional constraints as consisting of
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal restraints (sanctions, taboos,
customs, traditions, code of conduct), which usually contribute to the perpetuation of order and
safety within a market or society. In my view, North’s (1991) formal institutional rules coincide
with the regulative pillar in Scott’s (1995) framework, while Scott (1995) further delineates
North’s (1991) informal institutions into cognitive and normative pillars of institutional
environment. In the current study, generally, I adopt Scott’s (1995) framework in analyzing
institutional distance between emerging markets and developed markets. Occasionally, to
enhance the readability of the writing, I use formal institutions to refer to the regulative pillar of
the institutional environment. For example, one of the salient characteristics of an emerging
market lies in its transition to develop formal institutions, which consist of sophisticated
regulations and rules associated with business dealings.
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2. EMNCS’ LEGITIMACY IN A DEVELOPED MARKET
EMNCs, compared to other multinational firms, may potentially encounter greater threats
to their status as a legitimate player in a developed market. This is primarily due to the large
institutional distance between EMNC’s host, developed market and home, emerging market.
First, differences between the emerging market and the advanced market on the regulative pillar
are readily visible. For instance, accounting standards, investor protection procedures (Pagano,
Roell, & Zechner, 2002), and legal requirements surrounding listing and registration in a stock
market (Karolyi, 1998; Marosi, & Massoud, 2008) all differ between emerging and advanced
markets. Formal institutions, consisting of rules and regulations related to all sorts of business
dealings, are less developed in EMNCs’ home countries (Peng, et al, 2008). Thus, EMNCs may
find it challenging to establish legitimacy in a developed market if their original corporate
practices are not consistent with more rigorous regulations in the developed market.
Second, the cognitive-cultural distance between emerging markets and developed
markets can be analogues to the difference between western and eastern cultures. Most of the
developed markets are located in North America and Western Europe, two areas that share
substantial cultural overlap. EMNCs, on the other hand, are likely to be from other regions (e.g.,
Asia or Latin America) and will thus be embedded in different cultures. As such, it is likely that
EMNCs face large cultural differences and may thus find it difficult to conform to pressures
reflecting the cognitive pillar of advanced markets. For example, one of Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions, individualism, captures one of the major cultural differences between the Western
and Eastern culture. EMNCs, originating in an Eastern culture that values collectivism over
individualism, may adopt an organizational design valuing collective effort, such as group-based
rewards for performance. When EMNCs utilize such collective-oriented practices in a more
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individualistic host market, the host market employees and other stakeholders may not readily
view these practices as legitimate.
Third, normative pressures in regards to what is considered as best practice in the
industry can vary between developed markets and emerging markets. Particularly, some widely
acceptable practices among EMNCs are not commonly adopted by AMNCs. For instance,
family-owned business groups are a prevalent form of organization among some EMNCs, such
as Chinese and some Latin-American firms (Yeung, 2000). This practice may be derived from a
collective culture where the family affiliation is deemed as an important criterion to earn a stake
in the company. Established Japanese and South Korean enterprises also utilize these forms of
business conglomerates, such as the Keiretsu (Lonien, 2007) and Chaebol (Kim, 2003), to
efficiently expand their business landscape. Similarly, family members’ cross-holding of
company stock among affiliated companies is observed in some European countries with a
collectivistic culture, such as in Switzerland (Faccio & Lang, 2002), but not among U.S. firms
embedded in an individualistic culture.
Additionally, several common practices designed to improve the transparency of
corporate governance in developed markets are not commonly adopted among firms in emerging
markets. For example, the separation of ownership and control in modern, western corporations
promotes several corporate governance practices, such as independent boards and third-party
auditing, to improve the effective monitoring of the management (Fama & Jensen, 1983;
Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). These corporate governance practices may be gradually
adopted by EMNCs due to the globalization of financial markets, but these practices are not well
established as best practices in the EMNCs’ home institutional environment.
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Based on the above discussion of the three pillars of institutional environments, Table 3
summarizes the threats to EMNCs’ organizational legitimacy in developed markets. The three
pillars serve as a convenient categorization scheme to analyze national differences in institutional
environments. The influences of these pillars on corporate practices, however, are not necessarily
independent of one another. For instance, the ethical beliefs of a society promoting corporate
social responsibility (CSR) may drive the cognitive categorization of which type of practice is
considered to be socially responsible (Tang & Wang, 2011). Further, these CSR practices can
also influence and be influenced by various governmental regulations (Williams, Lynch-Wood,
& Ramsay, 2006). The aforementioned normative pressure associated with modern corporate
governance is another example of the cognitive-cultural influence. Hence, I acknowledge that for
a given predominant practice in the institutional field, the three pillars and their corresponding
pressures may facilitate the proliferation of the practice and its isomorphism within the field.
However, there may be a more salient pressure from one pillar than the others in a given
organizational practice. For instance, the minimum wage requirement imposed by labor law may
be a stronger regulative pressure for a company’s pay policy than the pressures from the
normative and cognitive pillars.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 3 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------C. ENTRY MODE SELECTION
The previous section suggests that EMNCs have great needs to enhance their legitimacy
so that they can compete effectively in developed markets. In other words, facing diverse
institutional demands from host developed markets, EMNCs need to strategically formulate their
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responses to enhance their legitimacy in developed markets, and thereby enhance their chance of
survival. In the current study, an EMNC’s entry mode strategy in their cross-border merger and
acquisition events is identified as an important strategic posture to enhance EMNCs’ legitimacy
in a developed market.
1. TYPE OF ENTRY MODE
International entry mode research explores the forms of operation firms use to expand
their boundaries overseas. Firms may choose to “enter foreign markets through contracts (with
distributors, resource suppliers, licensees and franchisees) or by extending the firm abroad,
setting up sales or manufacturing subsidiaries, and should they decide to set up such affiliates,
whether they will share the ownership of such affiliates with other firms (an equity joint venture
[JV]) or decide to keep full ownership (a wholly owned subsidiary [WOS])” (Brouthers &
Hannart, 2007, p. 395-396). Thus, one way to categorize entry mode is based on the amount of
equity investment. For instance, based on a sample of foreign entry activities into China between
1979 and 1998, Pan & Tse (2000) find support for a hierarchy of entry modes. While entering a
foreign market, firms first consider between non-equity-based modes and equity-based modes.
Within the equity-based modes, the choice is between wholly owned operations and partially
owned operations, while within the non-equity-based modes, the choice is between exporting and
contractual agreements, such as licensing and franchising.
Furthermore, some researchers suggest that equity investment, in contrast with market
contracts, signals a form of internalization and should be considered as an expansion of a firm’s
boundary. In other words, the equity investment involved in a JV or WOS to gain ownership of
foreign affiliates reflects a firm’s internalization effort by establishing hierarchical forms of
organization (Hennart, 2000; Pan & Tse, 2000). In the form of market contract transactions,
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input suppliers, the contracting parties are paid ex ante. By contrast, in an equity involved
investment, input suppliers, the partnering firms are paid ex post from the profits of the venture.
Thus, when it is difficult to define, and costly to measure the contribution ex ante, firms may opt
for equity investment, rather than non-equity investment, to gain either partial or full ownership
of the entity. Both partially and fully owned operations are considered types of hierarchical form
of foreign investment (Hennart, 2000). Extended from the above view, Brouthers & Hennart
(2007) propose that equity-involved modes of entry can be categorized into four types based on
two dimensions, establishment mode and ownership mode, as shown in Table 4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 4 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Brouthers & Hennart (2007) further suggest that both partial acquisitions (i.e. acquiring
partial ownership of an existing firm) and Greenfield JV (i.e. starting a joint equity firm from
ground up) should be categorized as JVs as both involve a process where input providers are paid
for their inputs through a share of the profits of the venture (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). As
such, entry mode can be classified into a joint hierarchical structure (Greenfield JV and Partial
acquisition) and a sole hierarchical structure (Greenfield WOS and Full acquisition). This
classification has great theoretical appeal. Both forms of organizational structure share the
common characteristics of a hierarchy, which utilizes bureaucracy to internalize market
contracting activities. The dichotomous classification of hierarchical structures versus joint
hierarchical structures extends the traditional TCE view on entry mode. While a sole hierarchical
structure rises as markets fail, a joint hierarchical structure rises as both markets and sole
hierarchical structures fail.
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2. OWNERSHIP POSITION AND NATIONAL DIFFERENCES
Determining an appropriate level of equity ownership in a foreign investment is an
important international strategic decision (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & Gatignon,
1986; Taylor, & Zou, 1998). This decision making involves important considerations such as
resource commitment, degree of control and type of risk (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson &
Gatignon, 1986; Taylor, & Zou, 1998). Traditionally, researchers assume a continuum of
commitment, control, and risk involved in various types of entry modes, ranging from exporting,
market contracts (e.g. licensing and franchising), JV to WOS. Most of the early entry mode
research relied on TCE and posited that asset specificity and information asymmetry drive firms’
entry mode choices. Asset specificity is defined as a durable investment which is transactionspecific and cannot be readily deployed without a sacrifice of productive values (Williamson,
1975). In international entry mode research, R&D intensity is usually operationalized as a main
predictor of asset specificity (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Gatignon &
Anderson, 1988; Kim & Hwang, 1992). The TCE view on entry mode suggests that asset
specificity significantly increases switching costs and predicts a high level of equity ownership.
An increasing equity ownership may enhance the focal firm’s strategic control to mitigate the
risks associated with its transaction partner’s opportunistic behaviors.
TCE researchers focusing on the relationship between ownership position and national
differences hypothesized that country risk and cultural distance are major sources of uncertainty
(Brouthers, & Hannart, 2007). According to Williamson (1975), uncertainty is only problematic
when it is in combination with asset specificity. When there is little asset specificity, switching
costs are negligible so uncertainty will not significantly increase transaction costs. Such a
discussion of national differences focuses on behavioral uncertainty. Transaction costs increase
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as national differences intensify negotiation and monitoring challenges. Therefore, based on
TCE, a hierarchical form of ownership structure, such as full acquisition, rather than a joint
hierarchical form is prescribed to be a better form for entry as it mitigates the trading partners’
opportunistic behaviors (Willaimson, 1975, 1981).
Such a view on national differences is somewhat simplistic. Facing greater environmental
uncertainty, a foreign acquirer may not necessarily opt for a higher ownership position. A recent
review suggests that national differences between the acquirer’s and target’s nations should be
conceptualized as two types of uncertainty—endogenous and exogenous uncertainty (Ahsan &
Musteen, 2011). Endogenous uncertainty, exemplified by cultural differences, can be overcome
through acquisition experience (Chi, 2000; Folta, 1998; Roberts & Weitzman, 1981). In other
words, through learning from the local partner, acquirers will be able to reduce the risks
associated with endogenous uncertainty over time, and this learning experience becomes a firmspecific advantage. As such, a high level of endogenous uncertainty would predict a high level of
equity ownership. Exogenous uncertainty, such as economic volatility, however, is independent
of the firm’s actions and can only be resolved through passive observation. Firms may choose to
delay the decision to invest directly and passively observe the host-country environment. Thus, a
high level of exogenous uncertainty would predict a low-control entry mode. Other research also
indicates that when there is a large amount of uncertainty, foreign acquirers prefer lower equity
ownership, so that they can be flexible in dealing with contingencies (e.g. Erramilli & Rao, 1993;
Herrmann & Datta, 2002; Rajan & Pangarkar, 2000). Further, a meta-analysis has shown that
various measures of country risk and cultural distance demonstrate a negative relationship with
the probability of choosing a sole hierarchical (WOS) mode of entry over a joint hierarchical
structure, such as JV (Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004).
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TCE is powerful in explaining firms’ behaviors built upon assumptions related to trading
partners’ information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviors, but it is limited in conceptualizing
environmental uncertainty in international business activities, such as the aforementioned
difference between endogenous and exogenous uncertainty. Given the limitations of transaction
cost explanations of entry mode, researchers have begun to derive predictions of entry mode
using other theoretical perspectives. For example, Yiu & Makino (2002) utilize institutional
theory and suggest that the choice of entry mode can be viewed as the consequence of
organizational responses to isomorphic pressures arising from a firm’s need to establish
legitimacy in the host market. Utilizing a sample of 364 Japanese subsidiaries, they find support
that institutional theory offers additional explanatory power for foreign entry mode choice
beyond predictions based on transaction cost theory (Yiu, & Makino, 2002). Their finding
suggests that a JV, instead of WOS, provides Japanese MNCs’ needed legitimacy to enter
markets with more regulative and normative pressures towards isomorphism. In other words,
based on institutional theory, foreign acquirers may benefit from the spillover effect of the local
partners’ legitimacy. Thus, a large institutional distance predicts foreign acquirers’ lower equity
ownership.
In the current study, I utilize the theoretical lens of institutional theory to analyze national
difference based on the three pillars of institutional distance, which provides a comprehensive
examination of national differences, including regulative, cognitive, and normative institutional
demands. Further, based on EMNCs’ unique characteristics, I predict that EMNCs respond to
institutional pressures differently from AMNCs in the next chapter.
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3. EMNCS’ INTERNATIONALIZATION AND ENTRY MODE CHOICES
As mentioned, due to their latecomer status in competing in the global economy, EMNCs
may internationalize at an early stage to reap the benefits of owning operations overseas. First,
some emerging economies may lack a sizable customer base (e.g. Taiwan) or sufficient
consumers’ purchasing power (e.g. China) to sustain EMNCs’ growth. Hence, expanding
overseas is critical for these EMNCs to achieve economies of scale or scope (Bonaglia,
Goldstein & Mathews, 2007). Second, due to the less developed economy and transitional
institutions in the home market, EMNCs may have limited opportunities to acquire needed
strategic resources at home. EMNCs, thus, may benefit from acquiring additional resources in a
foreign location (Bonaglia et al, 2007; Makino, et al., 2002). Third, EMNCs may diversify
market risks associated with their home markets (e.g. unpredictable governmental regulations)
by operating in a foreign location (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007). Based on
the above reasoning, we may conclude that internationalization serves a more fundamental
purpose than to improve performance—it may be critical for an EMNC’s survival.
To accrue the benefits of foreign expansion, EMNCs, however, need to make a prudent
strategic decision on entry mode. Among an array of possible entry mode options, cross-border
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are more advantageous, because foreign firms utilizing M&As
can build a local presence quickly, overcome traditional trade barriers, and encounter fewer
financial risks than when utilizing Greenfield investments (Datta & Puia, 1995). While outward
FDI from emerging economies continues to increase, cross-border M&As are shown to be a
popular entry mode among EMNCs. For example, the value of cross-border M&As undertaken
by Chinese MNCs in 2008 was 68 billion dollars, which makes up 18% of the outward FDI from
China. Overall, EMNCs accounted for 17% of worldwide mergers and acquisitions in 2010
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(Economist, 2011). Researchers have documented that EMNCs utilize a series of cross-border
M&As to accelerate their internationalization process (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti & Singh,
2009). A recent comparative study reveals that Chinese and Indian MNCs utilize cross-border
M&As to exploit their “comparative ownership advantages” (Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012).
Building on Ricardo’s (1817) concept of comparative advantage and Dunning’s (1980) OLI
framework, Sun et al. (2012) propose that EMNCs may utilize cross-border M&As as an
instrument to capitalize on the factor endowments of their home economies, mainly cheap labor
and natural resources, and thus compensate for their latecomer disadvantages. For instance,
Chinese firms, having access to cheaper labor in manufacturing industries, tend to have intensive
cross-border M&As in manufacturing industries, while Indian firms, having access to cheaper
labor in service industries, tend to have intensive cross-border M&As in service industries (Sun
et al., 2012).
Cross-border M&A activity thus provides an ideal context to study EMNCs’ legitimacy
in a developed market because 1) it is a prevalent entry mode for EMNCs; 2) there is substantial
equity involved in M&A events, so EMNCs’ decisions to enter the developed market are likely
to be a planned action rather than a trial, short-term decision. Given the increasing numbers of
EMNCs, a few studies have focused on predicting EMNCs’ entry mode. As shown in Table 5,
most research on EMNCs’ internationalization activities utilized a sample of firms originating
from a single emerging economy (except for Aybar & Ficici, 2009 and Malhotra, Sivakumar, &
Zhu, 2011). For instance, Chinese firms are shown to prefer wholly owned subsidiaries to seek
strategic assets and rely on joint ventures to expand market share (Cui & Jiang, 2009). Turkish
firms prefer joint ventures over wholly owned subsidiaries while entering a market with great
ethical-societal uncertainty (Demirbag, McGuinness & Altay, 2010). Taiwanese firms are found
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to utilize high-control entry mode when locating their investments in parts of China with greater
social, cultural and economic linkages (Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse & Lien, 2007).
These pioneering studies showcased country-based differences across EMNCs from a
few emerging markets. A logical next step will be to utilize a greater sample of EMNCs from
various

emerging

economies

to

conduct

a

systematic

examination

of

EMNCs’

internationalization behavior. In the current study, I apply institutional theory to offer a
systematic examination of whether EMNC’s ownership position and subsequent firm
performance in cross-border M&A events are influenced by institutional distance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 5 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND FIRM
PERFORMANCE
As globalization advances, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBAs) have become a
particularly important entry mode for firm’ internationalization (Gubbi, et al., 2010). Worldwide
M&A activity reached a record of $4.5 trillion in announced deals in 2007, a 24% increase over
the previous year. Among all M&As worldwide, CBA accounted for 47 % of transactions in
2007 (Platt, 2008). Despite their popularity, CBAs often fail (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993).
Recently, KPMG reported that only 17% of international acquisitions accomplished preacquisition performance expectations.
Even though CBA events have been examined using several financial and strategic
approaches, our knowledge about predictors of CBA performance are still limited. A recent
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meta-analysis suggests that commonly considered factors, such as relatedness of business and
payment methods, do not significantly explain the performance of CBA events (King, Dalton,
Daily, & Covin, 2004). Organizational researchers have contributed to this issue by examining
cultural difference as a major hurdle for the integration of two entities, which may substantially
determine post-acquisition performance. In domestic acquisition events, cultural clashes were
shown to increase administrative difficulty (Sales & Mirvis, 1984) and feelings of discomfort
and hostility (Buono et al., 1985). Add to this, the differences in culture at the national level and
it is clear that these differences may be a major determinant of CBA success or failure.
Based on Hofstede’s (1980) influential framework on national cultural dimensions,
cultural distance has become the most commonly employed measure of national difference in
CBA studies. Findings of the relationship between cultural distance and firm performance
remain equivocal (Reus, & Lamont, 2009; Stahl, & Voigt, 2005). While some studies reported
negative effects of cultural distance on the performance of CBAs, other studies suggested that a
large cultural distance leads to enhanced acquisition performance (cf. Stahl & Voigt, 2005). Reus
& Lamont (2009) propose that cultural distance is a “double-edged sword”, which may impact
the performance of a CBA in both positive and negative ways. Specifically, they find that
cultural distance is negatively associated with acquisition performance through the mediating
effects of inferior integration caused by low understandability and communication between
acquirer and target (Reus & Lamont, 2009). Conversely, cultural distance provides potential
synergy benefits for the combined entity by tapping diverse knowledge and resources in two
countries. The more dramatically different the acquirer and target are from each other, the greater
the synergy benefits. However, without successful integration activities, such synergy potential
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may not be realized, and cultural distance can pose a serious challenge to the ongoing
performance of the combined entity.
As latecomers to the global business landscape, EMNCs are particularly lacking in
international experience and expertise in cross-cultural management. Thus, integration may
become a major obstacle for them to accrue the benefits of synergy expected after merger and
acquisition events. According to a recent study on EMNCs’ M&As events between 1991 and
2004, while 60% of EMNCs’ acquisition targets are located in emerging economies, the
remainder of the targets are in developed economies (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). In this study, on
average, the announcement of most cross-border expansions in developing markets led to value
destruction of EMNCs’ stock performance, while EMNCs’ acquisitions in developed markets are
associated with positive stock market reaction (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). In addition, several
factors appear to improve the market reaction to EMNCs’ decision on overseas expansion
through M&A, such as the extent of equity participation (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). In the next
chapter, I further illustrate that EMNC’s ownership position can be an important contributing
factor to the success of CBA events, which ultimately leads to an EMNC’s superior long-term
firm performance.
III. THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Given an EMNC’s potential difficulty in establishing legitimacy in developed markets, I
conduct a two-phase study to examine whether EMNCs’ ownership decision is influenced by
institutional distance. Specifically, this study focuses on EMNCs’ ownership position, the
percentage of acquired stake in cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) events. As shown in
the conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1, the three pillars of institutional distance between
emerging markets and developed markets are conceptualized as the source of EMNCs’
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competitive disadvantage—providing challenges for EMNCs to establish legitimacy in
developed markets. To address these challenges, EMNCs may formulate their ownership
strategy, taking into account institutional distance, to enter the developed market and
subsequently enjoy better firm performance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In Phase One, I compare and contrast whether EMNCs and AMNCs opt for different
ownership positions in response to institutional distance. EMNCs and AMNCs, both of which
are foreign acquirers entering a developed market, are susceptible to legitimacy threats rising
from the institutional distance between their home and host markets. Due to EMNCs’ unique
motivation for internationalization—seeking strategic resources in the developed market,
EMNCs may respond to such legitimacy threats differently than their counterparts. Further, the
three pillars of institutional distance may also result in differential pressures on AMNCs and
EMNCs. Thus, I examine whether EMNCs and AMNCs experience these institutional pressures
differently. In Phase Two, moving beyond the comparison between AMNCs and EMNCs, I
focus solely on EMNCs. In the first step, I examine whether several emerging market
characteristics may influence EMNCs’ acquired stake in the developed market. Emerging
markets are not homogeneous in their country development, so several important indicators of
country development, such as human capital development, may differentiate EMNCs’ need for
legitimacy. In the second step, focusing on individual EMNCs, I further account for specific firm
characteristics, such as international experience and market position, which can mitigate the
legitimacy threat. Finally, I examine how EMNCs’ ownership position, accounting for
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institutional distance and EMNC firm characteristics, subsequently influences EMNCs’ firm
performance.
A. PHASE ONE: EMNCS VS. AMNCS
1. COMPARING EMNCS’ AND AMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION
According to institutional theory, an organization’s conformity to institutional pressures
grants organizations legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1991) and
legitimacy is important to organizational survival and success (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Elsbach,
1994; Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2001). Strategically, organizations utilize multiple means to signal
their legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Based on the practices of traditional, established MNCs,
recent studies suggest that by sharing ownership with local firms, foreign acquirers can
effectively mitigate their threats to establishing legitimacy in the host market (Brouthers, 2002;
Yiu, & Makino, 2002). By contrast, few studies have systematically examined EMNCs’ entry
mode, particularly EMNCs’ ownership position in cross-border M&As. Based on EMNCs’
unique characteristics, I argue that EMNCs may choose different entry strategies than do
AMNCs. In the following section, I will first examine AMNCs’ ownership position and then
predict EMNCs’ ownership position.
Based on past literature, AMNCs are expected to opt for a smaller equity share while
entering a target market with larger institutional distance (e.g. Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Herrmann
& Datta, 2002; Rajan & Pangarkar, 2000). Specifically, by venturing with a local partner in the
host market, the foreign firm can mitigate the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995, 343).
Institutional distance constitutes a major source of liability of foreignness, which results in three
major competitive disadvantages for foreign firms, including unfamiliarity hazard, relational
hazard, and discrimination hazard (Eden, & Miller, 2004). First, unfamiliarity costs reflect a
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foreign firm’s lack of host-market knowledge (Eden, & Miller, 2004). For example, a local bank
may have a better sense in regard to the central bank’s actions in lowering interest rates than a
foreign bank (Zaheer, 1995). Unfamiliarity hazard may be overcome by a foreign firm with
operational experience in the host market, but entering the host market with a local partner who
can readily provide host-market knowledge may efficiently alleviate unfamiliarity hazard
(Makino, & Delios, 1996).
Second, relational hazard refers to organization costs, in terms of both coordinating
within the firm and with constituents outside the firm (Eden & Miller, 2004). The extant TCE
literature suggests that a foreign firm may face relational hazards coming from external or
internal constituents’ potential opportunistic behaviors under conditions of information
asymmetry and bounded rationality (Buckley & Casson, 1998; Henisz & Williamson, 1999).
Even without the constituents’ intentional opportunism, a foreign firm may encounter difficulty
in smoothly completing intra-firm and inter-firm transactions in the host market. A foreign firm
is at a disadvantage in effectively communicating with host market constituents due to the
diverse values, beliefs and worldviews resulting from the cognitive and normative pillars of
institutional distance (Kostova, 1997). Thus, the relational hazard facing a foreign firm comes
from the lack of innate host-cultural knowledge needed to monitor host-market constituents’
potential opportunistic behaviors as well as to reconcile diverse values and beliefs. A local
partner, who is embedded in the host institutional environment, may provide effective
monitoring and constant facilitation of daily operations to enhance coordination within the firm
and outside the firm.
Third, discriminatory hazard refers to the discriminatory treatment inflicted on the
foreign firm relative to local firms in the host country (Eden, & Miller, 2004). Kotova & Zaheer
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(1997) suggest that the host-country stakeholders’ unfamiliarity with the foreign firm may result
in stereotypes and higher standards being imposed on foreign firms. By partnering with a local
firm, a foreign firm can benefit from the “spillover effects” of the local firm’s legitimacy in the
host market by sharing the local firm’s reputational capital, which resides in the local network
(Yiu & Makino, 2002). Thus, having a local partner with a certain level of equity participation
can help alleviate the host market stakeholders’ concern about the foreign acquirers’ legitimacy.
In sum, in sharing ownership with a local partner, AMNCs may effectively and
efficiently alleviate unfamiliarity, relational, and discriminatory hazards resulting from the
liability of foreignness associated with institutional distance. Thus, I expect that in facing larger
institutional distance, AMNCs will opt for a smaller ownership position to mitigate the
disadvantages associated with liability of foreignness.
H1: For AMNCs, institutional distance, including regulative distance (H1a),
cognitive distance (H1b), and normative distance (H1c), is negatively associated
with their ownership position in a cross-border merger and acquisition event in a
developed market.
The hypothesized negative relationship between institutional distance and ownership
position, however, may not hold true for EMNCs due to their unique motivation to enter
developed markets as well as their potential large deficit of legitimacy in developed markets.
First, a recent review suggests that MNC’s motives for market entry are an important yet
understudied predictor of entry mode (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Such a case can be made
particularly for EMNCs’ entry into developed markets. To compensate for their latecomer
disadvantages, EMNCs enter advanced markets to acquire advanced technology, as well as
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managerial and marketing knowledge (Makino, et al., 2002). As such, a developed target market
with greater institutional distance may have potentially significant learning benefits for EMNCs.
For instance, a large normative institutional distance between the home and host market indicates
a large difference in business practices, so EMNCs may improve their strategic competence by
adopting the best practices in the developed market. This learning benefit has been termed a
synergy effect in the cross-border M&A literature (Eun, Kolodny, & Scheraga, 1996; Larsson, &
Finkelstein, 1999; Stahl & Voigt, 2008). Such a synergy effect may be particularly salient for
EMNCs. For instance, a recent study suggests that an Indian firm may increase its value through
international acquisitions because the firm can acquire tangible and intangible resources that are
both difficult to acquire through market transactions and challenging to develop internally
(Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010). Further, such value creation is greater when
Indian firms enter developed markets, where target firms are more likely to carry higher quality
resources and thus provide stronger complementarities to Indian firms’ existing capabilities
(Gubbi, et al., 2010).
To fulfill their strategic goals in developed markets, EMNCs may need substantial
control over the foreign entity (Demirbag, Tatoglu, & Glaister, 2009). The transfer of tacit
technological know-how particularly requires an extensive coordination effort between the
sending and receiving parties (Teece, 1977). A sole hierarchical structure has superior efficiency
over other forms of organization structure in transferring tacit knowledge across borders (Kogut
& Zander, 1993). Therefore, to successfully transfer the acquired strategic assets to other
subunits, EMNCs may opt for a high level of control, denoted by a high ownership position
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). An opposing argument can be made by
suggesting that a dominant equity position is not the only way to secure control. Researchers
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suggest control can also be exercised through non-ownership mechanisms such as formal
contracts, management teams and other informal control mechanism (Beamish & Banks, 1987;
Yan & Gray, 1994). However, EMNCs that have limited resources and less international
experience may not be skillful in utilizing these non-ownership control mechanisms (Demirbag,
et al., 2009). Therefore, to successfully transfer acquired strategic assets, EMNCs have a
propensity to seek large ownership positions to effectively exercise substantial formal control.
Second, ownership position does not only indicate degree of control but also the level of
partner involvement (Kogut, 1988; Makino & Delios, 1996). Due to their large deficit in
legitimacy, EMNCs may simply not be able to find local partners who are willing to share
ownership (Mulok, Raja & Ainuddin, 2010; Sim & Pandian, 2003). In the marketing literature,
country-of-origin effects have been utilized to refer to the degree to which generalization and
perceptions about a country influence an actor’s judgment of that country’s products and/or
brands (Lampert & Jaffe, 1996; Roth & Romeo, 1992). Similarly, in the current context, EMNCs
are likely to bear additional liability of foreignness due to country-of-origin stereotypes
associated with the less developed economy of their home country. For instance, a Chinese piano
maker found it difficult to enter the U.S. market because customers are reluctant to purchase
Chinese made pianos due to the low quality stereotype associated with products made in China.
To overcome consumers’ stereotypes, this Chinese firm acquired a German piano brand and
marketed its products strictly under the German brand (Peng, 2009).
Due to the country-of-origin stereotype, EMNCs may not have an egalitarian stand in
cross-border deal negotiations and need to pay above market value to offset the liability. For
instance, a recent study suggests that compared to their developed-market counterparts, EMNCs
tend to bid higher on average to acquire assets in developed countries (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas,
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2010). Given the greater challenges that EMNCs face compared to AMNCs, sharing ownership
with a local firm may not be a feasible option for EMNCs to overcome their liability of
foreignness as discussed in H1a.
Based on the above reasoning related to EMNCs’ strategic motivations and country-oforigin liability, I expect that the negative association between institutional distance and equity
ownership suggested for AMNCs does not apply to EMNCs. Instead, there will be a positive
association between institutional distance and ownership position.
H2: For EMNCs, institutional distance, including regulative distance (H2a),
cognitive distance (H2b), and normative distance (H2c), is positively associated
with their ownership position in a cross-border merger and acquisition event in a
developed market.
2. DIFFERENT PRESSURES OF THE THREE PILLARS OF INSTITUTIONAL
DISTANCE
The institutional literature suggests that institutional pressures from each of the three
pillars may influence the isomorphism of the institutional field and corporate strategies
differently (Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 2000; Kostova, 1997; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu &
Shenkar, 2002). For instance, by analyzing a sample of Japanese MNCs and their subsidiaries
located across 44 host countries, Xu & Shenkar (2002) found that regulative and normative
distances are negatively related to the percentage of equity ownership and expatriate staffing.
Thus, they conclude that MNCs may choose to lower their ownership and expatriate staffing to
gain legitimacy in a host country where the regulative and normative distances are high.
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Along similar lines, I expect that the three pillars of institutional distance affect the
corporations’ need for legitimacy differently, and thus place differential isomorphic pressures on
their entry mode choices. For example, compared with the cognitive and normative pillars of
institutional environments, the regulative pillar, consisting of regulations and laws, is more
explicit than social values and norms, and thus presents less difficulty for foreign firms to
understand (Kostova, & Zaheer, 1999). In addition, regulative pillars of institutional pressure are
enacted through rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities in a society (Scott, 1995).
The interpretation of regulative institutional demands is usually controlled by a centralized
enforcement mechanism, such as a governmental judicial system, so foreign firms simply need to
follow one set of rules to become compliant with regulative institutional pressures. After all, in
developed markets, regulatory institutions are generally well developed. Thus, regulative
institutional rules in a developed market are often clearly set and applied to all relevant
organizations in a consistent manner.
On the other hand, the normative and cognitive pillars of institutional pressures do not
have the coercive enforcement power carried by regulatory institutions. Without the restrictive
constraints from the regulatory body, organizations have more discretion when responding to
such institutional pressures (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). As such, it takes more time and effort
for foreign firms to learn the specifics of cognitive and normative institutional demands. In
addition to understanding institutional pressures, foreign firms will also need to allocate
extensive resources to be compliant with cognitive and normative institutional pillars. For
instance, Kostova & Zaheer (1999) discuss one of Cargill’s projects in India and suggest that
Cargill was able to deal with the more explicit regulatory requirements related to environmental
issues, but had much greater difficulty understanding Indian farmers’ resistance, which resulted
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from the shared fear among Indian farmers that their cooperation would become the first step
toward a “new colonization” of India by the West (Dewan, 1994). Therefore, they concluded that
compared to the regulative pillar, the cognitive and normative pillars of the institutional
environment present greater challenges for a foreign firm in establishing legitimacy (Kostova &
Zaheer, 1997).
Given the above discussion of the nature of the three pillars of institutional pressures, we
can see that foreign firms face greater challenges associated with the cognitive and normative
institutional distance in establishing legitimacy. Thus, MNCs’ decisions on ownership position
are less likely to be influenced by the institutional distance of the regulative pillar when
acquiring a foreign target in a developed market. Particularly, for AMNCs, to comply with
regulative institutional rules in another developed market may only require minor adjustments to
original daily operating procedures because AMNCs have learned to operate in an institutional
environment with sophisticated business regulations in their home country. In some cases,
AMNCs may not need to adjust their original operational procedures, if the host, developed
market does not place more restrictive regulative pressures on the AMNC than the AMNC’s
home market. For instance, a German firm entering the U.S. market may face less regulative
pressure to adjust its environmentally friendly procedures to conform to the U.S. standard, since
the firm is accustomed to operating in an institutional environment with stringent environmental
protection regulations. Therefore, I expect that among the three pillars of institutional distance,
the regulative pillar has the weakest association with AMNCs’ ownership position in crossborder merger and acquisition events.
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H3: For AMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional distance on
ownership position has the least influence among the three pillars of institutional
distance.
Compared with AMNCs’ operational experience in their home, developed markets,
EMNCs are not as accustomed to following well-developed regulative institutional rules. For
EMNCs, the development of additional organizational routines is required to become compliant
with extensive, more sophisticated business regulations and rules. Recent research suggests that
EMNCs are not universally disadvantaged in competing with other MNCs in various institutional
environments (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2011). Accustomed
to operating in a weak market-supporting institutional environment in their home markets,
EMNCs have an advantage in utilizing their experience to deal with uncertainty in another
country with a similar institutional environment (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2008; CuervoCazurra, & Genc, 2011). By contrast, when EMNCs enter a dissimilar institutional environment,
such as the one in developed markets characterized by well-defined, market-supporting
institutional rules, EMNCs cannot effectively utilize their existing non-market based advantage,
and need to develop additional organizational routines to respond to more sophisticated, complex
institutional demands (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2011). For instance, advanced capital markets
are more stringent in evaluating the quality of information provided; a complex political system
with more extensive political rights and civil liberties requires firms to be more sophisticated in
responding to multiple stakeholders’ potentially competing demands (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc,
2011). Thus, the regulative pillar of institutional distance may not be easily overcome by
EMNCs in attempting to establish legitimacy in a developed market.
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In addition, compared to the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional distance,
regulative institutional distance represents a large, readily observable difference between
developed markets and emerging markets. Extant finance and economic research on emerging
market characteristics centers on the inefficiency of the market mechanism, such as a lack of
transparency and high levels of corruption, in emerging economies (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz,
2007; Klapper, & Love, 2004). Much less discussion has been focused on the non-regulative
institutional environments of emerging markets. Thus, most of the developed market
stakeholders’ negative evaluations of emerging markets may come from differences in the
regulative pillar of institutional distance rather than the other two pillars. In other words, the
institutional distance of the regulative pillar may become a more salient country-of-origin
stereotype of emerging markets for developed market stakeholders than the other two pillars. In
addition, the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional distance, such as national cultural
difference, may only be viewed as differences between countries, and are less likely to be
associated with the negative evaluation of EMNCs’ country of origin (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc,
2011). Therefore, for EMNCs, regulative institutional distance presents larger challenges to
establishing legitimacy in developed markets.
In sum, EMNCs may not readily overcome regulative institutional distance because of
EMNCs’ lack of experience in complying with more sophisticated business-related institutional
rules as well as considerable country-of-origin stereotypes associated with the regulative
institutional environments of EMNCs’ home, emerging economies. Therefore, I expect that the
regulative pillar of institutional distance has a stronger association with an EMNC’s ownership
position than other two pillars. The positive association between institutional distance and
ownership position is expected to be larger for the regulative pillar than the two other pillars.
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H4: For EMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional distance on
ownership position is the strongest among the three pillars of institutional
distance.
B. PHASE TWO: EMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
In Phase One, EMNCs were treated as a homogeneous group to contrast with AMNCs’
when considering internationalization behavior. In Phase Two, moving beyond the comparison
between EMNCs and other MNCs, I focus on EMNCs to further delineate whether various home
market and firm characteristics influence EMNCs’ ownership position and subsequent firm
performance. First, salient home market characteristics, including human capital development,
global connectedness, and historical connections to the host market, are selected to differentiate
one emerging market from another. Second, firm characteristics, including market leading
position, international presence, media coverage and stock market cross-listing, differentiate one
EMNC from another EMNC originating from the same emerging economy.
1. EMNCS’ HOME MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
As discussed earlier, EMNCs encounter greater liability of foreignness, which emanates
from the country-of-origin stereotypes associated with their home, emerging economies. These
country-of-origin effects have been shown to influence important firm strategies and outcomes,
such as product positioning strategies and resulting product performance (Roth & Romeo, 1992;
Samiee, 1994). Product performance generally decreases when consumers’ perceptions of the
product are negatively impacted by the country of origin effect (Roth, & Romeo, 1992). Recent
studies suggest that an EMNC’s stock performance in its initial public offering (IPO) in a
developed market can also be influenced by the investors’ perception of the EMNC’s country of
origin (Bell, Moore, & Filatotchev, 2012; Bell, Moore, Al-Shammari, 2008). Lacking company-
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specific information related to EMNCs, foreign investors in the developed market utilize the
country level characteristics of the EMNCs’ home emerging economy as information cues to
determine whether to invest in EMNCs’ IPOs (Bell, Moore, & Filatotchev, 2012; Bell, Moore,
Al-Shammari, 2008). Thus, unfavorable impression of EMNC’s home economy, such as lacking
a sophisticated auditing system, is carried over to evaluate EMNCs unfavorably.
The aforementioned country-of-origin effect can be further explained through the social
categorization process in individual level research. Social categorization theory (Tajfel, &
Turner, 1985) suggests that to reduce uncertainty, individuals tend to categorize other individuals
into social groups and interpret these individuals’ behaviors according to the features of the
social groups. Thus, each individual is often evaluated either based on his or her social category
membership (e.g. gender or ethnicity), or his or her personal attributes (e.g. personalities or
abilities). When social category memberships (e.g. a person’s gender and ethnicity) are readily
visible features, individuals may rely on social categorization process to expedite the cognitive
processing of the information related to the individual (Tajfel, & Turner, 1985). Stereotyping,
and subsequent discrimination behaviors, occurs when social actors rely heavily on the social
category membership to evaluate an individual without taking into account an individual’s
personal attributes (Elsass, & Graves, 1997; Dovidio, & Hebel, 2005).
Similarly, studies of the country-of-origin effect (see review in Samiee, 1994) support
that consumers sometimes rely on perceptions of country of origin (a social group) to evaluate a
product with less consideration for the product attributes. Particularly, in the context of
international business decisions, corporate purchasing managers are shown to be influenced by
their country-of-origin perception in their sourcing decisions among suppliers across the globe,
even though the global sourcing decisions are made in a more complex social context than a
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consumer’s buying decision on a product (see review in Anderson & Chao, 2003). Along similar
lines, developed market stakeholders considering EMNCs’ entry mode into developed markets
may evaluate EMNCs unfavorably when they apply stereotypes associated with emerging
economies, such as low product quality, to evaluate EMNCs’ legitimacy. In other words, the
stereotyping effect further explains the aforementioned EMNCs’ challenges to find a local
partner who is willing to share ownership with.
Building on the findings of stereotyping process, I propose several home market
characteristics can alleviate EMNCs’ challenges to form partnership with a local firm. The
stereotyping process has been studied as an individual’s schematic processing (e.g. Locksley,
Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980; Kulik, Bainbridge, Hugh, & Cregan, 2008). Schema refers
to mental representations of knowledge regarding a specific domain, such as the stereotypical
beliefs associated with a social category (Fiske, & Taylor, 1991). Schematic processing requires
less time and effort (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Two contingencies may alleviate the likelihood of an
individual’s automatic schematic processing. First, stereotyping processing is reinforced by the
match between the focal individual’s characteristics and the social actor’s prototypes of the traits
and behaviors of a certain social category (e.g. stereotypical beliefs) (Kulik, et al., 2008). On the
other hand, when the social actor recognizes that discrepancy exists between the focal individual
characteristics and his or her stereotypic beliefs, the social actor is often motivated to engage in a
more deliberate cognitive processing route to resolve such discrepancies, and thus, is less likely
to stereotype the focal individual (Kulik, et al., 2008). In the current context, I propose that
human capital development in an emerging economy serves as an important indicator of the
nation’s capability in producing high quality products, thus creating such a cognitive discrepancy
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for developed market stakeholders. Hence, developed market stakeholders are less likely to
stereotype EMNCs, originating from an emerging market with high levels of human capital.
Second, schema researchers also found that individuating information (e.g. personal
attributes) decreases social actors’ tendency to judge an individual based on stereotypical beliefs
associated with a social category (Locksley, et al. 1980; Locksley, Hepburn, Ortiz, 1982a;
Locksley, Hepburn, Ortiz, 1982b). When individuating information is available, social actors are
more likely to utilize individuating information rather than the stereotypes (Locksley, et al. 1980;
Locksley, et al., 1982a; Locksley, et al., 1982b). In the current context, I argue that an emerging
nation’s global connectedness and historical connection with the host market suggests the extent
to which the developed market stakeholders have individuating information about the nation,
thus decreasing the likelihood of attributing stereotypes to evaluate EMNCs’ legitimacy. In a
latter section, I will elaborate on how global connectedness and historical connections may
enhance developed market stakeholders understanding of the emerging nation as an individual
nation rather than as a member of emerging economies.
a) HUMAN CAPITAL
Historically, MNCs often relocate their manufacturing plants to less developed countries
to exploit both cheaper labor as well as less rigorous labor standards (Porter, 1990). But skilled
labor is harder to come by in these countries due to lower levels of economic development and
reduced opportunities for education. Consequently, MNCs have traditionally mass produced lowend, labor-intensive products in less developed countries and produced parts and products which
require greater technology and skilled labor in advanced countries (Porter, 1990). Because of the
unskilled labor force, products manufactured in these less developed countries have traditionally
been associated with lower quality. For example, South Korean products used to be stigmatized
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as being of poor quality and only after several electronics brands, such as Samsung and Goldstar,
began seeing success in the global marketplace did the perceptions of South Korean products
improve (Holt, Quelch, & Taylor, 2004).
Due to cheaper labor and inferior infrastructure, EMNCs may be plagued with countryof-origin stereotypes that are associated with mass-produced, cheap quality products. On the
other hand, human capital development in an emerging economy, including skilled labor and
innovative capacity, may alleviate the developed market stakeholders’ negative evaluation. A
nation’s innovative capacity refers to a country’s progress in producing and commercializing
innovative technology over the long term (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002). Human capital,
including skilled labor and innovative capacity, may provide the stock of a capable labor force
and advanced technology in a nation which may propel economic growth (Romer, 1986). Human
capital availability in a nation does not only increase the amount of FDI, but it also brings more
upstream FDI activities into these host markets (Dunning, 1998).
Particularly, human capital in an emerging market has been shown to attract foreign
direct investment into an emerging economy (Pourshahabi, Mahmoudinia, & Soderjani, 2011).
Human capital development in an emerging nation thus may serve as an effective indicator that
the stereotype associated with low product quality does not match with the characteristics of the
focal emerging nation. As discussed above, due to this cognitive discrepancy, individuals are less
likely to attribute stereotypes to such an emerging nation. Therefore, EMNCs, originating from
an emerging market with more human capital, are less likely to be influenced by the developed
market stakeholders’ negative evaluation on their legitimacy. For instance, the innovative
capacity of Taiwanese and Indian IT industries may help alleviate Taiwanese and Indian firms’
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challenges to establish legitimacy in a developed market. As such, the legitimacy threat
associated with institutional distance is mitigated.
H5: Human capital development in an EMNC’s home country moderates the
relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position
such that human capital development, including skilled labor (H5a) and
innovative capacity (H5b), decreases the influence of institutional distance on an
EMNC’s ownership position in a developed market.
b) GLOBAL CONNECTEDNESS
Global connectedness refers to the ability of resident individuals and companies to
interact and exchange information with other parts of the world (Berry, Guille´n, & Zhou, 2010).
Global connectedness, usually operationalized as the extent of internet coverage in a nation, has
been a particularly important concept in the studies of online commercial activities (Oxley &
Yeung, 2001) and economic growth (Lucas, 1993, 2002). These studies suggest that countries
with greater global connectedness are in a better position to integrate in the global community,
increasing the information exchange between the country and the world. Further, a country may
strengthen its innovative capacity through the integration of global knowledge, subsequently
experiencing economic growth (Lucas, 1988, 1993). Thus, global connectedness can be
considered to be a source of a nation’s competitive advantage. For instance, through a large
volume of international trade, emerging nations, such as the BRICS countries, may provide an
environment in which domestic firms are accustomed to competing with other international
firms.
Specifically, in the context of contemplating the stereotypes associated with emerging
economies, global connectedness alleviates developed market stakeholders’ stereotyping of
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EMNCs. As discussed earlier, greater country-specific information availability motivates social
actors to engage in deliberate cognitive processing based on country-specific information rather
than the stereotypes associated with emerging economies. Thus, an emerging nation well
connected with the global community is more likely to be known as an individual nation rather
than a member of emerging economies. In addition, an emerging nation’s image can be improved
because the country may be granted a high status through global connectedness which indicates
the nation’s competitive advantage (Lucas, 1988, 1993). For instance, through a high level of
global connectedness, emerging economies, such as the BRICS countries, are more likely to be
known as emerging nations with great potential to compete with advanced economies.
H6: The global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country moderates the
relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position
such that the global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country decreases the
influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership position in a
developed market.
c) HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS TO THE HOST DEVELOPED MARKET
In contrast with global connectedness, which describes general connections with a global
community, historical connection denotes a specialized tie with the host market. The historical
connections may be formed through colonizer-colonized link, common language, common
religion, and common trade block membership, etc. The historical connections indicate
interaction history between two countries at some point in time. For instance, Christian
missionaries have purposefully gone into remote areas in the world to improve local education,
literacy, social justice, and economic development (Lakina, & Getachew, 2012). While
developing local churches, these missionaries introduced the western style of living into
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emerging economies and cultivated important human capital for the emerging economies
(Lankina, & Getachew, 2012).
The historical connection is stronger when the emerging nation has multiple connections
with the host developed market. For instance, even though English is commonly used in India,
Indian firms may have a closer tie with the British culture than with American culture because of
the additional colonizer-colonized link with the British. An emerging nation’s historical
connection to the host developed market may alleviate a EMNCs’ legitimacy threat in a couple
of ways. First, EMNCs, originating from emerging nations with historical connections, have
greater understanding of the host developed country, thus having better capability to overcome
the liability of foreignness, such as unfamiliarity hazard (Eden & Miller, 2004). Second,
developed market stakeholders may view emerging nations with historical connections in a more
positive light than other emerging economies. The historical connections may foster a sense of
proximity and encourage developed market stakeholders to view such an emerging market as
more similar than different from the developed nation. In the internationalization literature,
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975, p.308) have famously used the British Commonwealth
as an example to illustrate that previous colonial links can alleviate business managers’ concerns
of the negative impacts of geographic distance on efficient international operations. In the
previous example, India and the United Kingdom may seem to be far apart geographically but
are often viewed to share some common features because of the previous colonial link (Dow &
Karunaratna, 2006).
H7: The historical connections of an EMNC’s home country to the host developed
market moderates the relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s
ownership position such that the historical connections of an EMNC’s home
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country decreases the influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership
position in a developed market.
2. EMNCS’ FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
a) EMNCS’ FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND OWNERSHIP POSITION
Based on previous discussions, a shared ownership control may grant foreign firms
needed legitimacy in the host market. Institutional distance, a major threat to establishing
legitimacy in the developed market, does not equally impact all EMNCs. Several firm
characteristics may signal EMNC legitimacy, which should be factored into their consideration
of ownership strategy. Referencing the institutional literature, researchers have recently
suggested that EMNCs may signal their legitimacy in two important ways—through
organizational capabilities and the validation by third-party institutions (Ivanova, & Castellano,
2010).
First, organizational capabilities can be resources or competencies (Johnson, Scholes, &
Whittington, 2005). Possessing fewer resources in relation to their counterpart AMNCs, EMNCs
may demonstrate their competencies through their performance as indicated by a market leading
position and international presence. Suchman (1995) notes that an organization’s immediate
constituents may judge the organization’s legitimacy based on a pragmatic calculation of an
organization’s activities. In the context of CBA events, an EMNC may prove its worthiness as a
partner by demonstrating its competence. For instance, Asus is a multinational computer
hardware and electronics company headquartered in Taiwan. Asus started out as a motherboard
manufacturer for Intel and successfully built its leading position in the PC component market by
leveraging its connection with Intel. After Intel recognized Asus’ superior engineering capacities
in the manufacture of Intel486 processors, Asus gained exclusive contracts to manufacture
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processors and other computer components for Intel, despite competition from many other
established PC manufacturers, such as IBM (Bushell-Embling, 2009). Ever since, Asus has
become one of the major global players for laptop and hand-held device. In a case like this, Asus
has proven itself through its leading position in the industry, so its legitimacy will be less likely
to be questioned in a developed market.
H8: The extent of an EMNC’s market leading position moderates the relationship
between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an
EMNC’s market leading position decreases the influence of institutional distance
on its ownership position in a developed market.
The level of international experience, both general and target-country specific, has been
widely discussed in entry mode literature (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Kogut & Singh, 1988).
An EMNC’s familiarity with the region of the target market and international business in general
may enhance their ability to identify good investment opportunities, reduce information
asymmetry, and alleviate the liability of foreignness (Harzing, 2002; Martin, Swaminathan, &
Mitchell, 1998). While fewer EMNCs have a worldwide presence than AMNCs, EMNCs present
in multiple foreign locations are in a better position to alleviate the legitimacy threat associated
with institutional distance than EMNCs with only a few foreign locations.
H9: An EMNC’s international presence moderates the relationship between
institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an EMNC’s
international presence decreases the influence of institutional distance on its
ownership position in the developed market.

59

Second, in addition to EMNCs’ demonstration of organizational capabilities through their
market leading position and international presence, EMNCs may utilize third-party endorsements
to mitigate the threat to their legitimacy. Bitektine (2011) reviewed various conceptualizations of
organizational legitimacy and suggested a long-standing method for organizations to improve
stakeholders’ evaluation of an organization’s legitimacy was through the organization’s linkages
with highly legitimate social actors in its environment. In the context of CBA events, the local
media plays an important role in bolstering an EMNC’s legitimacy in a developed market by
providing positive coverage (Rottig, & Reus, 2009). Particularly, in the U.S., popular news
magazines, such as BusinessWeek and Forbes, periodically track the development of emerging
markets. They may provide immediate access for developed market stakeholders to evaluate a
EMNCs’ past performance. Thus, media coverage from these popular magazines can effectively
improve the public’s impression of an EMNC’s reputation and thus improve its legitimacy
(Rottig, & Reus, 2009).
H10: Media coverage of an EMNC moderates the relationship between
institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that media
coverage in a developed market decreases the influence of institutional distance
on its ownership position in a developed market.
Additionally, a potentially effective way for EMNCs to alleviate their stakeholders’
concerns is by cross-listing their shares in a stock market in a developed market, such as in the
U.S. The cross-listing premium, the higher market return of listed foreign firms versus non-listed
foreign firms, has been well documented in the finance literature (Karolyi, 1998; Pagano, Roell,
& Zechner, 2002). Basically, through the endorsement of a powerful government agency or
quasi-government agency, these foreign firms signal their commitment to compliance with the
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dominant practices in the field, such as adhering to more stringent accounting standards (Pagano,
et al., 2002). For example, for foreign firms to list on U.S. exchanges, they must comply fully
with GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) reporting and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) regulations, which typically require a higher level of disclosure than most
international accounting standards (Karolyi, 1998). In other words, these firms are under
rigorous monitoring of their financial reports, and thus may improve the transparency of their
corporate governance. As a result, stakeholders of the foreign firms may be encouraged to view
these foreign firms as legitimate players in their business. Particularly, EMNCs may benefit
greatly from such an endorsement to alleviate their country-of-origin stereotype, resulting from
less rigorous, unsophisticated business regulations in their home countries.
H11: An EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market moderates the relationship
between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an
EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market decreases the influence of
institutional distance on its ownership position in a developed market.
b) EMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Pioneering research on EMNC’s internationalization suggests that developed markets
provide an ideal location for EMNCs to acquire strategic assets to compensate for their latecomer
disadvantages (Makino, et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2005). Empirically, studies on EMNCs’ CBA
events demonstrate that an EMNC’s acquisition of target firms in developed markets receives
positive reactions from the stock market (i.e. cumulative abnormal returns). Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray,
Sarkar, & Chittor (2010) conducted an event study of 425 CBAs by Indian firms during 20002007 to support their prediction that EMNCs’ acquisitions of target firms in more advanced
markets generate greater abnormal returns. In addition, Aybar & Ficici (2009) also utilize an
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event study but examine a broader sample of 433 CBA announcements associated with 58
EMNCs during the sample period of 1991-2004. Their results show that EMNCs’ CBA events,
on average, lead to value destruction (i.e. lower firm abnormal returns), while acquisitions
involving targets that are located in culturally distant and economically developed markets lead
to higher firm value.
Given the initial evidence of investors’ positive reactions towards EMNCs’ CBA events
in developed markets, I further probe the association between the EMNCs’ ownership position
and subsequent firm performance. In the CBA literature, post-acquisition performance is
considered related to the success of integration between two entities (Slangen, 2006; Stahl, &
Voigt, 2008). Post-acquisition integration involves combining people, resources, and activities
from two entities into one organization. Based on Hofstede’s cultural distance dimensions, CBA
researchers find inconsistent effects of cultural distance on firm performance after acquisitions.
Some studies suggest that cultural distance is negatively associated with firm performance
(Datta, & Puia, 1995; Francis, Hasan & Sun, 2008), while other studies supported the view that
the performance of CBAs is enhanced if the acquirer and the target come from culturally distant
countries (Eun, Kolodny, & Scheraga. 1996; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005; Chakrabarti,
Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009). Recently, a few researchers have suggested that the
mixed results occurred because there are both positive and negative effects of national cultural
differences (Stahl & Voigt, 2008; Slangen, 2006; Reus, & Lamont, 2009). The positive effects
come from the diverse knowledge and resources provided by a large national cultural difference
between the acquirer and the target. CBAs provide the acquirer with access to a diverse set of
routines embedded in national cultures (Barney, 1986; Hofstede, 1980; Kogut & Singh, 1988;
Morosini & Singh, 1994). The negative effect is associated with post-acquisition integration. The

62

larger the national cultural differences between the acquirer and the target, the harder it is to
integrate the two entities due to incompatible organizational practices, which are largely
influenced by national cultures (Weber et al., 1996). As Chakrabarti et al. (2009) posited,
“Cultural difference may enhance the potential synergies of a merger, particularly through
capability transfer, resource sharing and learning, but only at the cost of increased integration
challenges.” Thus, to increase CBA performance, the acquirer needs to improve integration by
minimizing the obstacles of post-acquisition integration. In turn, this will allow for the
realization of greater synergy originating from a larger cultural difference between the acquirer
and the target (Stahl & Voigt, 2008).
Above all, EMNCs’ ownership position may influence the success of post-acquisition
integration and subsequent firm performance. Taking into consideration institutional distance,
EMNCs may formulate their ownership position to alleviate legitimacy threat in a developed
market. The EMNCs, opting for lower ownership position, would have a better chance to
navigate post-acquisition challenges by counting on their local partners, thus enjoying better firm
performance. However, a counter argument can be made based on EMNCs’ primary motivation
to enter developed markets. Seeking complimentary strategic assets, EMNCs may fulfill their
goal to compensate for their latecomer disadvantages only when they can successfully transfer
these acquired strategic assets back to other units of EMNCs. Based on the rationales provided in
Hypothesis 2, EMNCs may need dominant control in the acquired entity to ensure the transfer of
strategic assets. Thus, a high ownership position may be more effective in contributing to overall
firm performance. As such, a set of competing hypotheses is provided below to assess the
association between EMNCs’ ownership position and subsequent firm performance.
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H12a: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a higher ownership
position experience better post-acquisition overall firm performance.
H12b: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a lower ownership
position experience better post-acquisition overall firm performance.
C. SUMMARY
Given the rising phenomenon of EMNCs, the current study intends to provide an in-depth
examination of a practical strategic issue facing EMNCs. To successfully compete with AMNCs,
developed markets are attractive locations of foreign entry for EMNCs to acquire strategic assets,
which may compensate for their latecomer disadvantages in global competition. However, to
fulfill their strategic goals, EMNCs need to make prudent decisions on their entry strategy to
address the challenges of establishing legitimacy in developed markets. Through a multi-phase
empirical examination of EMNC’s ownership position in a developed market, I provide evidence
to demonstrate how institutional distance impacts an EMNC’s chance of success in a developed
market.
In Phase One, I consider how EMNCs may formulate their ownership position differently
from other MNCs given the potentially larger institutional distance between EMNCs’ home and
host markets. In general, a large institutional distance may lead a foreign firm to consider taking
less ownership to enjoy the spillover effects of the local firm’s legitimacy. However, this
prediction of a negative association between the institutional distance and equity ownership may
differ for EMNCs for a couple of reasons. First, EMNCs, seeking to transfer learned practices
from the developed market to the rest of its organization, may prefer a higher percentage of
ownership to ensure substantial control in transferring core competencies between subsidiaries
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(Makino & Beamish, 1998). Second, due to their large deficit in legitimacy, EMNCs may simply
not be able to find local partners who are willing to share ownership. Therefore, based on the
above two explanations, I expect that the anticipated negative association between institutional
distance and equity ownership does not exist for EMNCs. Instead, there may be a positive
association between institutional distance and full equity ownership.
Furthermore, the various dimensions of institutional distance may place differential
isomorphic pressures on their entry mode choices. The regulative pillars of institutional distance
are most easily understood (Kostova, 1997) and thus present less difficulty for foreign firms to
establish legitimacy than the cognitive or normative pillars of institutional distance. Thus, for
developed MNCs, I propose that the regulative pillar will have a weaker association with entry
mode than the cognitive or normative pillars. However, such predictions may not hold true for
EMNCs for two reasons. EMNCs may not readily overcome regulative institutional distance
because of EMNCs’ lack of experience in complying with more sophisticated business-related
institutional rules as well as considerable country-of-origin stereotypes associated with the
regulative institutional environments of EMNCs’ home, emerging economies. Therefore, I
expect that the regulative pillar of institutional distance has a stronger association with an
EMNC’s ownership position than other two pillars.
In Phase Two, moving beyond the comparison between EMNCs and AMNCs, I focus on
a sample of emerging market firms to delineate how EMNCs’ specific home market and firm
characteristics influence their entry mode choices, and subsequently, their firm performance.
First, not all emerging markets are homogeneous. Emerging markets may vary in their degree of
human capital development, global connectedness, and historical connections with the host
developed market. These home market characteristics are hypothesized to influence developed
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market stakeholders’ perceptions of EMNCs’ legitimacy. As a result, EMNCs from various
countries of origin may have different degrees of need for legitimacy. Second, according to the
recent discussion about organizational agency, firms are believed to be able to position
themselves differently within similar institutional fields. In the current context, firm level
characteristics, including the EMNCs’ market leading position, global presence, media exposure,
and cross-listing in the developed market, are hypothesized to mitigate the effect of institutional
distance on their ownership positions. Thus, the threat of legitimacy is not equally salient to all
EMNCs from the same emerging market. Furthermore, ownership decision is suggested to
influence post-acquisition performance. On the one hand, a shared ownership control may
enhance EMNCs’ legitimacy in the developed market, thus contributing to better performance.
On the other hand, a dominant control may enhance EMNC’s ability to transfer acquired
strategic assets, thus leading to better performance. Thus, a set of competing hypotheses is
offered to investigate the performance implication of EMNCs’ ownership position. Table 6
summarizes the above proposed hypotheses.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 6 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IV. METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, I discuss the research methodology used to test the hypotheses developed
in Chapter 3. This chapter provides a detailed description of the sample, a discussion of the
dependent and independent variables, as well as an overview of the statistical methods used to
test the hypotheses.
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A. SAMPLE
The sample of the current study includes all of the foreign firms that made cross-border
acquisitions in the United States during the sampling period (noted below). This data was
acquired through the Thomson SDC Platinum database. The U.S. market is a particularly ideal
location to study EMNCs’ cross-border acquisitions for two reasons. First, besides the relatively
stable investment environment, the U.S. has very few restrictions on foreign investment, so
foreign firms generally have great discretion in making entry mode decisions to respond to
institutional pressures (Goodrisk & Salancik, 1996). Second, the U.S. market is by far the most
popular developed market for EMNCs’ cross-border M&A activities (Economist, 2011). Thus, I
can capture the greatest amount of variance of EMNCs’ internationalization patterns in the U.S.
market using this approach.
The sampling period is from 2005 to 2011, which includes the year of the beginning of
the global financial crisis, 2008. By observing activity during this period, I have the opportunity
to control for the impact of the global financial downturn on internationalization for AMNCs and
EMNCs. In addition, variables measuring home market characteristics are more widely available
after 20054 which allows me to test my hypotheses more fully by examining more variables
associated with emerging markets.
Financial firms are excluded from the sample as they are usually subject to regulations
and laws that other firms are not subject to (Doidge, et al., 2007). In addition, it should be noted
that different samples are used for the two phases of the examination. While in Phase One, I
include all cross-border M&A events from both AMNCs and EMNCs in the sample, in Phase
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A portion of the data used for the institutional distance measure is collected through the Global
Competiveness Report, which encompasses more countries and more survey items after the year
of 2005.
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Two, I only include EMNCs as a subsample for analysis. The subsamples, AMNCs and EMNCs,
are created based on a dummy variable to classify the acquirers’ nation into advanced markets
and emerging markets. (“1” indicates emerging markets and “0” indicates developed market).
This classification is developed using the member countries of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and developed countries in the classification offered by
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The OECD is comprised of
34 highly industrialized member countries and such a classification has been used in past
literature (e.g. Gubbi et al., 2010). Additionally, UNCTAD publishes their worldwide economic
statistics based on a list of developed, transitional, and developing economies, which have been
utilized by researchers in sorting countries into developed or emerging markets as well (e.g.
Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2008). These two classification criteria have slight inconsistencies, in
which some of the OECD countries are not listed as developed economies in the UNCTAD
classification and vice versa. To reconcile the classification difference, in the current study,
countries are classified as developed markets only when the country meets both criteria—OECD
member countries and developed markets in UNCTAD classification. This creates a
classification with inter-rater reliability (Saal, Downey, & Lahey, 1980) between two wellestablished agencies in relation to international business. My initial search generated 1288 crossborder M&A events. The acquirers’ country of origin is shown in Table 7.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 7 About Here
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES
OWNERSHIP POSITION. The dependent variable for all of the hypotheses except for
H12a&b is the acquirers’ ownership position, measured as the percentage of the acquired stake
in the target firm. Data for this variable is obtained from the Thomson SDC Platinum database.
In past entry mode research, while some researchers treat ownership position as a continuous
variable (e.g. Hannart, & Reddy, 1997; Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2011), others used a
dichotomous variable classifying ownership position into full acquisitions (95% or higher) and
partial acquisitions (any acquired stake less than 95%) (e.g. Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Yiu, &
Makino, 2002). In the current study, I opt for treating ownership position as a continuous
variable for two reasons. Theoretically, any arbitrary dichotomizing method may create artifacts
and mask a meaningful relationship. In addition, treating the data as a continuous variable often
generates greater power to detect statistical relationships (Fitzsimons, 2008).
FIRM PERFORMANCE. The last hypotheses in Phase Two (H12a & H12b) predict
EMNCs’ firm performance, which is measured in multiple ways. I include an accounting
measure of firm performance, return on assets (ROA), as well as total sales (revenue). This data
is obtained from Worldscope Datastream database. The change in sales revenue and ROA in a
three year window (years 1-3) after the acquisition year is constructed as the dependent variable.
As shown in the equation below, the change in sales is calculated by using the firm’s total sales
in the year of the acquisition as the base year of comparison. (t refers to the year of acquisition,
and i refers to 1, 2, and 3 years.) The change in ROA is calculated in the same manner.

Focusing on investor reaction, the aforementioned two previous studies on EMNC’s
cross-border M&As have used event study methodology, utilizing stock performance within a
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very short window of time after the announcement of the M&A event (Aybar & Ficici, 2009;
Gubbi et al., 2010). Alternatively, I collect 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year lagged stock market
performance data for a supplemental analysis. The construction of dependent variables is similar
to the equation above, except replacing sales data with stock performance data. Also, the base
data is the year end data prior to the acquisition to account for the stock market’s reaction to the
acquisition event.
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE. As discussed above, institutional distance is analyzed
along the three pillars of institutional environment, including regulative distance, cognitive
distance, and normative distance. Theoretically, each of the three pillars of institutional distance
captures meaningful national differences. Thus, the three pillars of institutional distance are
treated as three separate dimensions and entered in the regression analysis as three separate
predictors.
The measures of each pillar of institutional distance are described below. First, the data
for regulative distance is collected from the Index of Economic Freedom, offered by the
Heritage Foundation. Economic freedom is a widely discussed concept in the economics
literature and it is designed to capture the degree of governmental policies in place to promote
market efficiency (Gwartney, 1996). According to the Heritage Foundation, economic freedom
refers to the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution or
consumption of goods and services (O’Driscoll, Feulner, & O’Grandy, 2003). The Heritage
Foundation has tracked and published an Index of Economic Freedom for 184 countries since
1995 (Johnson & Sheehy, 1996). A single index value of economic freedom has been widely
utilized to capture the level of development of formal, regulatory institutions (e.g. Aybar &
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Ficici, 2009). Regulative distance is calculated as the difference between the index values for a
given country and the United States (the host country).
Second, normative distance is obtained from the Global Competiveness Report published
by the World Economic Forum. The World Economic Forum and its associate institutes conduct
annual surveys among business executives in 153 countries. The survey items are aimed at
capturing the competitiveness of a nation’s business environment. In the past, data from this
report has been utilized by various researchers to construct institutional distance measures (Chao
& Kumar, 2010; Xu, Pan & Beamish, 2004). Considering the survey items utilized in previous
research, I generate a list of survey items pertaining to normative institutional distance. These
survey items tap into conventional corporate practices in each nation and are included in Table 8.
Further, for each acquiring firm’s home country, I aggregate the data of survey items from the
Global Competitiveness Report to generate a summation score for the normative pillar of the
institutional environment. As such, normative distance is the difference between the values for a
given country and for the United States. The Crobach’s alpha of country scores on these eight
survey items across multiple years in the sample period ranges between .945 and .963.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 8 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Third, in the past, institutional researchers tended to omit testing the cognitive pillar of
institutional environment for a couple of reasons. First, it overlaps with the traditional
conceptualization of cultural distance (Yiu & Makino, 2002), so the cognitive pillar of
institutional distance may not provide additional explanatory power beyond cultural distance,
which has been studied widely in the entry strategy literature based on the cases of established
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multinational firms. However, the current study is aimed at understanding EMNCs’
internationalization activities, which have not been widely studied utilizing cultural distance.
Second, both the cognitive and normative pillars of institutionalized practices are highly
influenced by national cultures, so researchers assume that the normative pillar of the
institutional environment encompasses the influence of the cognitive pillar. Thus, some
researchers have concluded that the cognitive pillar does not need to be studied separately or is
beyond the scope of their studies (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Xu, Pan & Beamish, 2002). As
discussed in the literature review, EMNCs potentially encounter distinct threats along these three
pillars of the institutional environment, and developing a better understanding of the cognitive
pillar may help capture significant challenges that EMNCs have in establishing legitimacy based
on national cultural differences. While regulative distance captures the difference in country
development of regulatory institutions, normative distance represents the difference in
predominant corporate practices across nations. Cognitive distance, represented by cultural
distance, reflects the national culture difference between acquirers’ home markets and host
market. Therefore, I include a measure of cultural distance in the current study to study the effect
of the cognitive pillar of institutional distance.
The data for cognitive distance is obtained through Hofstede’s website which has updated
country scores for five cultural dimensions, including individualism, uncertainty avoidance,
power distance, masculinity, and long-term orientation5 (e.g. Malhortra et al., 2011). Further, to
account for the difference in the variance of each dimension, Kogut & Singh (1998) have utilized
a composite index to represent cultural distance. This calculation of cultural distance has been
widely adopted among cultural distance researchers (e.g. Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998;
5

Note that long-term orientation is a recently added dimension of Hofstede’s cultural distance,
which captures an important cultural difference between the West and the East.
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Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Cho & Padmanabhan, 1995) and will be utilized in the current
study to calculate cognitive distance. The calculation of a composite index will be determined as
follows:
∑

where

{

(

)

}

,

stands for the value for the ith cultural dimension and jth country,

is the variance of

the value on the ith cultural dimension, u indicates the United States, and
is the cultural distance of the jth country from the United States. This equation takes into
account the variance of each dimension, thus standardizing the influence of each dimension on
the final composite index of cultural distance. Also, note that the composite index, produced by
squaring the difference score between two countries, does not carry the directionality of the
difference between the raw scores of two countries. It is a theoretically appealing way of
deriving cultural distance as it does not have implications for “more” or “less” (better than or
worse than), but instead indicates the differences in national cultures (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc,
2011).
HUMAN CAPITAL. The indicators of human capital development include skilled labor
and innovative capacity. Data representing these two measures is obtained from the Global
Competitiveness Report. Skilled labor (Crobach’s alpha ranges between 0.91 and 0.92 across
sample period) is measured by four items and innovative capacity (Crobach’s alpha ranges
between 0.93 and 0.95 across sample period) is measured by five items. Both measures are on a
7-point scale and items are listed in Table 9.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 9 About Here
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GLOBAL CONNECTEDNESS. This construct is measured by two items, including the
percentage of internet users to total population, as well as the foreign market size of a country.
Internet usage captures the global connectedness of information flow while foreign market size
represents the global connectedness of commercial activities. The data for internet users is from
the International Telecommunication Union. The data for the foreign market size is ranked by
the World Economic Forum on a 7-point scale (7=best) based on the value of exports of goods
and services in a country. Given the distinct meanings and measurements of these two indicators,
Internet usage and Foreign market size are entered as separate predictors in the regression
analysis.
HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS TO THE HOST DEVELOPED MARKET. The construct
is measured by three items, including common language, common major religion, and common
trade block membership. The data for common language and common religion are measured as
language distance and religion distance between the EMNCs’ home country and the host
market, the United States, where the main language is English and the predominant religion is
Christianity. The data for language distance and religion distance are collected from Dr.
Douglas Dow’s database, hosted by the Melbourne Business School’s website.6 Dr. Dow
included multiple sources and constructed religion distance and language distance between pairs
of countries to aid his research on the stimuli of psychic distance (e.g. Dow & Karunaratna,
2006; Dow & Larimo, 2009). Table 10 illustrates the distance from acquirer’s home countries to
the U.S.

6

https://sites.google.com/site/ddowresearch/home/scales retrieved on August, 1st, 2012.
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The variable common, current trade block membership is measured by a dummy variable,
free trade agreement; “1” indicates that EMNC’s home country has a free trade agreement with
the U.S., while “0” indicates that EMNC’s home country does not have a free trade agreement
with the U.S. Due to conceptual and scale differences among these three indicators of historical
connection, religion distance, language distance, and free trade agreement are entered as
separate predictors in the regression analysis.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 10 About Here
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MARKET LEADING POSITION. This variable is constructed by using total sales divided
by average industry sales in the acquisition year. Individual firm sales data is obtained from the
Worldscope Datastream database. Given that industry sales data is not widely available for many
emerging economies, average industry sales is calculated based on total sales of all of firms with
the same first digit of the SIC code in the sample.
INSTITUTIONAL PRESENCE. Referencing past researchers’ measures of international
experience (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Kogut & Singh, 1988) and considering the particular
context of the current study, I create this measure by counting the number of geographic regions
in which the firm has sales activities. Thus, the variable is essentially a measure of geographic
dispersion of EMNCs’ sales activities. The data is obtained through the Worldscope Datastream
database in which a firm can have as many as ten geographic segments of sales.
Media coverage. Given the relatively rare media coverage on EMNCs, I use a dummy
variable to indicate whether there is media coverage of the firm in business magazines, such as
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Forbes, Fortune, and BusinessWeek, prior to the acquisition events (“1” indicates “yes”, and “0”
indicates “no”). The data is collected through LexisNexis Academic search.
CROSS-LISTING. This measure is a dummy variable (“1” indicates “yes”, and “0”
indicates “no”) to indicate whether the firm lists its stock in major stock exchanges in the United
States. The data is obtained through a company search of the EDGAR database, maintained by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the current study, EMNCs are classified
as cross-listing in the U.S. when they list their stocks on NASDAQ and the New York Stock
Exchange as well as having American Depositary Receipt (ADR) issues in the United States.
CONTROL VARIABLES. Firm size and R&D intensity have been shown to influence
corporate strategy including international expansion strategy, so these two variables are included
as control variables. Firm size indicates the firm’s operational experience, and may enhance
managerial learning in evaluating contingencies related to entry mode decisions (see the review
of acquisition research in Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Firm size is measured by the total assets
of a firm prior to the acquisition. R&D intensity has been used by various researchers to measure
firm competence as well as asset specificity, both of which may influence entry mode strategy
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Due to the lack of data on EMNCs’ R&D expenses, I create a
dummy variable as a proxy, high tech industry, to indicate whether the acquiring firm is in a high
tech industry (“1” indicates “yes”, and “0” indicates “no”) and has the propensity to heavily
invest in R&D. Data for the aforementioned measures is obtained from Thompson SDC Platinum
and Worldscope Datastream databases. In addition, geographic distance, which may
significantly increase communication and transportation costs, has been widely discussed in
entry mode research (Berry et al., 2010) and is included as a control variable. The data for
geographic distance is collected from the CIA Factbook and calculated as the great circle
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distance (orthodromic distance) between two countries according to the coordinates of the
geographic center of the countries (Berry et al., 2010).
D. ANALYSIS
POWER ANALYSIS. In the past, research on the effect of cultural distance on entry mode
suggests an effect size of 0.06 (Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russel, 2005). Based on power analysis, to
achieve a desired statistical power of 0.8 in conducting a hierarchical regression of 10 predictors,
I need a minimum sample size of 223 (Soper, 2012). Given the final sample size of merger and
acquisition events (N=1650 for the phase one sample; N=497 for the phase two sample), I should
be able to detect meaningful statistical relationships.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING. The tests of the hypotheses related to ownership position are
conducted by using multivariate regression in SPSS. In Phase Two, to test the moderation effects
(i.e. H4-H11), I use centered variables to create interaction terms to help avoid multicollinearity.
All of the VIF values are below 10 in the regression analysis of the interaction effects. Thus, the
influence of multicollinearity on the statistical relationship should be limited (Aiken & West,
1991).
In terms of the last set of hypotheses related to firm performance, two-stage least-square
regressions are utilized. Since previous hypotheses suggest that various measures of institutional
distance influence EMNCs’ ownership position, the relationship between ownership position and
firm performance can be better modeled by controlling for these influences of institutional
distance on ownership position. Two-stage least-square regression models can provide such an
optimal identification (Angrist & Krueger, 2001).

In the first stage, the three pillars of

institutional distance and control variables are entered to compute estimated values of ownership
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position. In the second stage, the computed values of ownership position are entered to predict
firm performance. The analysis is conducted using SPSS 17.0.
V. RESULTS
A. PHASE ONE: EMNCS VS. AMNCS
1. COMPARING EMNCS’ AND AMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 11 and Table 12 about here
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------The mean, standard deviation, and correlation among the main variables used in Phase
One are reported in Table 11. In Phase One, I predict that while institutional distance is
negatively related to an AMNC’s ownership position, it is positively related to an EMNC’s
ownership position. As suggested in Table 12, the acquirer’s home country status significantly
moderates the associations between the normative pillar of institutional distance and the
acquirers’ ownership position. In other words, AMNCs and EMNCs differ in their ownership
position in response to normative institutional pressures, but do not differ in their ownership
position in response to the other two pillars of institutional pressure. To further probe the
moderation effect of the acquirers’ home country status (i.e. emerging markets or advanced
markets), I plot the interaction as shown in Figure 2. As suggested in Figure 2, facing larger
normative distance, AMNCs tend to adopt a lower ownership position while such a trend is not
demonstrated among EMNCs. The simple slope tests further reveal that the downward trend of
AMNCs’ ownership position is significant (β=-1.35, p<0.001), while the slight upward trend of
EMNCs’ ownership position is not significant (β=0.41, p=0.66).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Insert Figure 2 and Table 13 about here
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------To further examine the differential effects of the three pillars of institutional distance, I
conduct separate regression analyses for the subsamples of EMNCs and AMNCs. The subsample
analysis results, shown in Table 13, demonstrate the aforementioned differences among EMNCs
and AMNCs in responding to institutional distance. None of the three pillars of institutional
distance is significantly related to EMNCs’ ownership position. For AMNCs, cognitive distance
and normative distance are negatively related to AMNCs’ ownership position, while regulative
distance does not have a significant association with their ownership position. Associating the
above results related to the first two sets of hypotheses, I find that H1b and H1c are supported
while the rest of the hypotheses, including H1a, H2a, H2b, and H2c, are not supported.
2. DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES OF THE THREE PILLARS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE
To extend the analysis, I conduct post-regression coefficient difference tests within each
subsample to examine whether the three pillars of institutional distance have differential effects
on ownership position (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). A series of paired coefficient
difference test among the three pillars of institutional distance suggests no statistically significant
differential effects in the subsample of EMNCs. By contrast, for AMNCs, as predicted, the
regulative pillar has the weakest effect on AMNCs’ ownership position among the three pillars
of institutional distance. Thus, H3 is supported while there is no support for H4.
B. PHASR TWO: EMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
According to Table 13, the non-significant results across the three pillars of institutional
distance in EMNC sample maybe due to the relatively small sample size of EMNCs (N=185),
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thus lacking power to detect a significant statistical relationship. To enlarge the sample size, I
collected additional data through Worldscope Datastream, which is known to have more
comprehensive coverage of EMNCs. After merging data with SDC data of EMNCs’ acquisition
events, the sample size increases to 497 cross-border acquisition events conducted by 337
EMNCs, originating from 36 emerging economies. Table 14 shows the break-down of
acquisition events by country of origin and by acquisition year. The descriptive statistics and
bivariate correlations among the main variables in Phase Two are reported in Table 15.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 14, Table 15 and Table 16 about here
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 16 demonstrates the association of the three pillars of institutional distance on
EMNCs’ ownership position based on the enlarged sample. According to Table 16, the cognitive
pillar of institutional distance is consistently negatively associated with EMNCs’ ownership
position and is the only pillar with a significant association among the three pillars of
institutional distance. Thus, as indicated in Phase One, the empirical results do not support the
positive association between the three pillars of institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership
position, which was suggested in H2a-H2c. Among the three pillars of institutional distance, only
cognitive distance shows a significant negative association with ownership position, whereas
regulative and normative distances do not seem to associate with the EMNCs’ ownership
position.
1. EMNCS’ HOME MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
The first set of hypotheses in Phase Two deals with country-of-origin stereotypes, which
constitutes one of the major sources of legitimacy concerns in EMNCs’ acquisition events in the
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United States. Three types of EMNC home market characteristics are hypothesized to weaken
such stereotyping effects, thus mitigating the association between institutional distance and
EMNC ownership position. H5 suggests the degree of human capital development in an
emerging economy, measured by skilled labor and innovation capacity, may weaken this
association. According to Table 17, the extent of skilled labor in the EMNCs’ home country
moderates the association of regulative and normative distances with an EMNC’s ownership
position. The extent of innovation capacity moderates the association between cognitive distance
and EMNCs’ ownership position. Further, the main effect of the regulative pillar becomes
positive as hypothesized in H2a, while the main effect of cognitive distance remains negative.
The main effect of normative distance is not significant.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 17 and Figures 3-5 about here
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Figures 3-5 further illustrate the directionality of the moderation effect. H5a & H5b
suggest that the indicators of human capital development decrease the main effects of
institutional distance on EMNCs’ ownership position. The empirical evidence partially supports
the above assertion. Figure 3 suggests that facing larger regulative distance, EMNCs from
countries with low levels of skilled labor tend to take higher ownership positions (as illustrated
by a significant simple slope (β=1.15, p=0.01)), while such a relationship does not exist when
EMNCs are from countries with higher levels of skilled labor (β=-0.13, p=0.5). Likewise, this
weakening effect of the presence of skilled labor on the effect of institutional distance is
observed in the association between normative distance and the EMNCs’ ownership position. As
shown in Figure 5, facing larger normative distance, EMNCs from countries with low levels of
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skilled labor tend to take higher ownership positions (as illustrated by a simple slope, significant
at 0.1 level (β=2.7, p=0.07)), while such a relationship does not exist when EMNCs are from
countries with higher levels of skilled labor (β=-0.71, p=0.55). Thus, H5a is supported for
regulative and normative distance, but not for cognitive distance.
Furthermore, Figure 4 suggests the degree of innovation capacity strengthens the
negative association between cognitive distance and EMNCs’ ownership position, exhibiting the
opposite direction of the hypothesized moderation effect in H5b. Facing larger cognitive
distance, EMNCs from countries with high innovation capacity tend to take on a smaller
ownership stake (simple slop β=-13.44, p=0.001). For EMNCs from countries with low levels of
innovation capacity, their ownership position does not differ based on the extent of cognitive
distance (simple slop β=1.34, p=0.78).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 18 and Figures 6-9 about here
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Moreover, in H6, the global connectedness of EMNCs’ home countries is suggested to
decrease the association between institutional distance and the EMNCs’ ownership position. As
shown in Table 18, the extent of internet usage in the EMNCs’ home country moderates the
association with ownership position across all three pillars of institutional distance, while foreign
market size only moderates the association between regulative distance and ownership position
at a significance level of 0.1. Figures 6-9 further demonstrate the patterns of the moderation
effect. In Figure 6, facing a larger regulative distance, EMNCs, originating from countries with
high levels of internet usage tend to take lower ownership positions (simple slope β=-0.87,
p<0.001). By contrast, for EMNCs originating from countries with low levels of internet usage,
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ownership position does not differ based on the degree of regulative distance (simple slope
β=0.77, p=0.27). In terms of cognitive distance, Figure 8 reports a similar pattern. The negative
association between cognitive distance and EMNCs’ ownership position exists for EMNCs
originating from countries with high levels of internet usage (simple slope β=-7.76, p=0.001), but
does not exist for EMNCs originating from countries with low levels of internet usage (simple
slope β=0.77, p=0.75). Similarly, Figure 9 suggests that EMNCs from countries with high levels
of internet usage tend to take smaller ownership positions to enter countries with larger
normative distance (simple slope β=-4.01, p<0.001). Such a significant negative association
between normative distance and ownership position does not exist for EMNCs from countries
with low levels of internet usage (simple slope β=-1.20, p=0.38). In addition, Figure 7 suggests a
cross-over moderation effect of foreign market size on the association between regulative
distance and EMNCs’ ownership position. However, simple slope tests reveal EMNCs from
countries with large (simple slop β=0.24, p=0.61) or small (simple slop β=-0.45, p=0.14) foreign
market size do not significantly influence EMNCs’ ownership position decision while entering
markets with different degrees of regulative distance.
Therefore, the moderation effect of internet usage actually increases the association
between the three pillars of institutional distance and the EMNCs’ ownership position, rendering
contradictory support to H6a. And there is minimal support for H6b because of the barely
significant result associated with foreign market size.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 19 and Figure 10 about here
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Third, in terms of the moderation effects of the historical connections hypothesized in
H7, only minimal support is found. Table 19 reports regression results associated with indicators
of historical connections, including religious distance, language distance and free trade
agreements with the U.S. In this set of analyses, VIF values are above 10 when the three
indicators enter the regression models at the same time. To avoid the potential biased result due
to multicollinearity, two indicators, religious distance and language distance, are separate from
free trade agreement for regression analyses, as shown in Model 3-Model 6. VIF values in these
models are below 10, suggesting multicollinearity is not a concern. The same approach was
taken when conducting regression analyses for regulative distance and normative distance. Since
the relationships of the predictors do not differ while separating the indicators into separate
regression models, for the sake of parsimony, regression results using the three indicators in the
same regression model are reported.
Across all indicators of historical connections, the only significant interaction term occurs
when language distance moderates the association between regulative distance and EMNCs’
ownership position as shown in Model 4. Figure 10 further demonstrates the moderation effect.
For EMNCs originating from countries with large language distance from the U.S., cognitive
distance is negatively associated with EMNCs’ ownership position (simple slope β=-11.09,
p=0.003). When the EMNCs are from countries with small language distances, a marginally
significant positive association is observed (simple slope β=6.872, p=0.08). Thus, language
distance exacerbates the influence of cognitive distance on the EMNCs’ ownership position,
rendering support for H7.
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2. EMNCS’ FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
In H8-H11, various firm level characteristics, including market position, international
presence, media coverage, and cross-listing in U.S. markets, are hypothesized to decrease the
influence of institutional distance on EMNCs’ ownership position. As shown in Table 20, the
only significant interaction term, indicated in Model 6, occurs in the regression model of
normative distance. Figure 11 further reveals the pattern of the interaction effect. Facing larger
normative distance, EMNCs with low media coverage take higher ownership positions (simple
slope β=8.12, p=0.03). For EMNCs with high media coverage, their ownership position is
negatively related to normative distance (simple slope β=-5.56, p=0.04). In this case, media
coverage nullifies the positive association between normative distance and the EMNC’s
ownership position, rendering partial support for H10. In addition, there is no support for H8,
H9, and H11.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 20 and Figure 11 about here
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Finally, a set of competing hypotheses is offered to test EMNCs’ post-acquisition
performance in relation to their ownership position. Since the previous hypotheses suggest that
various measures of institutional distance influence EMNCs’ ownership position, the relationship
between ownership position and firm performance is modeled controlling for the influence of
institutional distance on ownership position by utilizing two-stage least-square regression models
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001). In the first stage, the three pillars of institutional distance and control
variables are entered as instrumental variables to compute estimated values of ownership
position. In the second stage, the computed values of ownership position are entered to predict
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firm performance, including changes in ROA, sales growth, and stock price in a three-year
window after the acquisition event.
The regression results suggest EMNCs’ ownership position is positively related to 1-year
(β=0.36, p=0.04), 2-year (β=0.75, p=0.01), and 3-year (β=0.63, p=0.02) sales growth after the
acquisition event. In addition, EMNCs’ ownership position is not significantly related to the
change in ROA or long-term stock performance. Therefore, we may conclude that controlling for
the influence of institutional distance, higher ownership position contributes to better sales
growth.
C. SUMMARY
Table 21 summarizes the hypotheses and correspondent results.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 21 about here
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------VI. DISCUSSION
Given the rising phenomenon of EMNCs, the findings of this study contribute to the
management literature in important ways. Utilizing institutional theory, I compare EMNCs’
entry mode decisions with other MNCs. The findings of this study may provide a foundation for
a new internationalization theory as well as inform executives about their entry strategy for both
EMNCs and AMNCs. Further, despite the common characteristics of a less developed economy,
emerging markets can differ on several important dimensions. In this study, I differentiate among
the levels of institutional constraints associated with EMNCs’ countries of origin by looking into
various home market characteristics, including human capital, global connectedness, and
historical connections with the host developed market. In this chapter, I first discuss the main
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findings of the study, and then the limitations of the study, potential future research directions,
and implications for practice.
A. COMPARISON OF AMNCS AND EMNCS IN RESPONSE TO INSTITUTIONAL
DISTANCE
First, I seek to determine whether institutional distance influences EMNCs’ ownership
position differently than AMNCs’ ownership position. The evidence from the first phase
suggests AMNCs are more susceptible to institutional distance in their ownership position than
EMNCs. As expected, the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional distance are negatively
associated with an AMNC’s ownership position. This finding is consistent with past literature in
suggesting that when facing larger legitimacy concerns, as indicated by larger institutional
distance, AMNCs are likely to take a smaller ownership position, thus relying more on the
legitimacy of local partner firms. In addition, as expected, regulative distance has the weakest
association among the three pillars of institutional distance with an AMNC’s ownership position.
Equipped with organizational routines which can be adapted to comply with another set of
sophisticated, regulatory institutional rules, AMNCs may find it easier to overcome legitimacy
threats in relation to the regulative pillar than the other two pillars of institutional distance.
On the other hand, in Phase One, the EMNCs’ ownership position decisions do not seem
to be influenced by any of the pillars of institutional distance. However, in Phase Two with a
larger sample of EMNCs, the empirical evidence offers a complex picture of how institutional
distance influences EMNCs’ ownership decisions. At first, based on a larger sample of EMNCs,
cognitive distance seems to exhibit the strongest negative association with EMNCs’ ownership
position across the three pillars of institutional distance (refer to Table 16). Cognitive distance
influences EMNCs’ ownership position in the same way that it influences an AMNC’s
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ownership position, thus rendering support for the legitimacy argument. Facing legitimacy
concerns exhibited by national cultural differences, EMNCs opt for lower ownership positions,
relying on local firms’ legitimacy to navigate in the host developed market. Overall, regulative
distance and normative distance do not seem to influence an EMNC’s ownership position when
not considering other home market characteristics.
B. INTERACTION EFFECTS OF EMNCS’ HOME MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
AND INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE
As I proceed to test H5-H11, it is further revealed that the three pillars of institutional
distance demonstrate complex associations with EMNCs’ ownership position. First, in terms of
the regulative pillar of institutional distance, as expected, when the EMNC’s home country
suffers from low levels of human capital development as indicated by a lack of a skilled labor
force, an EMNC’s ownership position is positively associated with regulative distance. Without
the buffering effect of human capital development in their home economy, EMNCs would need
to take on a greater ownership stake when faced with a large legitimacy deficit which may limit
them from finding local firms willing to share ownership. This finding may also be explained by
examining an EMNC’s strategic intent to enter a developed market. Lacking valuable human
capital in their home country, EMNCs may view the acquisition in the developed market as a
way to expediently upgrade their organizational capabilities to comply with a more sophisticated
regulatory institutional environment. Specifically, acquiring a greater stake in a developed
market target may signal an EMNC’s commitment to its stakeholders in implementing a higher
quality of corporate governance. Thus, EMNCs tend to acquire more ownership when facing a
larger regulative distance.
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In addition, global connectedness, as measured by high internet usage, buffers the
stereotyping effect derived from regulative distance in a different way than human capital
development. EMNCs, originating in countries well connected globally, through internet usage,
may not be plagued by country of origin stereotypes associated with emerging economies. Thus,
EMNCs may view regulative distance simply as a source of legitimacy threat, not dissimilar
from the threat of cognitive and normative distance. To rely on local firms’ legitimacy, these
EMNCs tend to take a smaller ownership stake when entering a country with larger regulative
distance. On the other hand, EMNCs, originating from countries with low internet usage, may
not have a choice but to acquire larger stakes when entering a developed market because these
EMNCs suffer from an additional liability of foreignness and cannot easily find firms to partner
with in the host market.
Second, in terms of cognitive distance, high innovation capacity and high internet usage
of the EMNCs’ home country promotes the likelihood for EMNCs to behave in a way similar to
the way AMNCs react to legitimacy concerns in their ownership decisions. Like AMNCs, these
EMNCs tend to take less ownership when entering a market with larger cognitive distance.
Furthermore, one of the historical connection indicators, language distance, further exacerbates
the influence of cognitive distance. EMNCs originating from a country with a larger language
distance and cognitive distance tend to take even less ownership. Third, in terms of normative
distance, global connectedness indicated by the extent of internet usage, once again, promotes
the likelihood for EMNCs to behave in a similar way to AMNCs. Like AMNCs, facing larger
normative distance, EMNCs originating from a globally connected emerging economy tend to
take less ownership in cross-border acquisition events.
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Overall, human capital development which is indicated by skilled labor and innovation
capacity, global connectedness which is indicated by internet usage, and historical connection
which is indicated by language distance are important home market characteristics that
differentiate emerging economies from each other. EMNCs, originating from various levels of
country development on these indicators, formulate ownership decisions differently to enter a
developed market.
C. MODERATION EFFECTS OF EMNCS’ FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
Among the various firm characteristics considered, the only significant interaction effect
is found while evaluating the moderation effect of media coverage on the association between
normative distance and EMNCs’ ownership position (refer to Figure 11). Under less media
coverage, EMNCs do not have the third-party endorsement necessary to eliminate developed
market stakeholders’ legitimacy concerns. Thus, EMNCs with less media coverage are likely to
take on more ownership facing large normative distance. On the other hand, EMNCs with media
coverage can buffer the stereotyping associated with their country of origin, thus behaving in the
same way as AMNCs. Facing large normative distance, EMNCs with media coverage take less
ownership to rely on local partners’ legitimacy.
It is interesting that none of the other firm characteristics, including market position,
international presence, and cross-listing, show moderation effects. This may suggest EMNCs
cannot easily attain legitimacy through individual firm business activities to overcome the
country of origin effects.
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D. EMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
The above findings suggest that various home country and firm level characteristics
interact to influence EMNCs’ ownership position in their acquisition events in the U.S.
Ownership position decisions are shown to be critical decisions to influence overall firm
performance in the international literature (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & Gatignon,
1986; Taylor, & Zou, S. 1998). Various contingencies, such as cultural distance and legitimacy
concerns, have been proposed to study the relationship between ownership position and firm
performance (Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). In the context of EMNCs, I provide initial
empirical evidence that ownership position is positively related to EMNCs’ sales grown. By
acquiring larger stakes in the developed market targets, EMNCs are able to expand their sales
volume in the subsequent years. However, EMNCs’ ownership position does not significantly
influence their long-term stock performance and ROA.
E. LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Based on pioneering studies of EMNCs’ entry strategy, I derive two major EMNC
considerations, legitimacy arguments and strategic asset-seeking motives, for hypotheses
building in the current study. Facing large institutional distance, an EMNC may tend to acquire
more ownership in their acquisition targets either because large legitimacy deficits inhibit them
from finding local firms to partner with or because these EMNCs desire dominant control to be
able to transfer acquired strategic assets. The hypotheses in Phase Two take the legitimacy
arguments further to examine various moderators which are suggested to buffer legitimacy
threats associated with institutional distance. Based on the findings of the current study, while
some home market characteristics show moderation effects, various firm level characteristics do
not.

Thus, it renders some support for the legitimacy argument that EMNCs’ ownership
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decisions are influenced by their country of origin characteristics, but, with the lone exception of
media coverage, not by their individual firm characteristics.
Without a fine-grained study on the micro processes associated with the acquisition
event, we will not be able to determine exactly how legitimacy or strategic considerations
operate under various contingencies. As a first step for future studies, I suggest formally
including an EMNC’s motivation to enter developed markets in building hypotheses. For
instance, EMNCs in a knowledge intensive industry may have a stronger motivation to acquire
complementary strategic assets in a developed market, so they have greater need to establish
dominant control. Thus, given the same institutional distance, EMNCs in a knowledge intensive
industry would acquire higher ownership stakes. One of the control variables in the current study
provides initial evidence that EMNCs in high technology industries are likely to acquire more
ownership (refer to the significant positive coefficients associated with “High Tech Industry” in
Tables 16-20). Other indicators of EMNCs’ strategic intent can be more thoroughly examined in
future studies.
Along a similar line, I suggest that researchers further probe the performance
implications of EMNCs’ ownership strategy. The finding in the current study provides initial
evidence that, controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs’ ownership position is related to
their performance outcomes. A closer examination may reveal a more detailed understanding.
Particularly, recent research proposes that institutional deviance may not necessarily be a
liability, and can be an advantage for foreign firms (Shi & Hoskisson, 2012). Firms, complying
with institutional constraints, may gain legitimacy to increase their likelihood of survival and
success. However, firms that deviate from institutional expectations may have a greater chance
for innovation and experience exponential growth. Similarly, EMNCs, plagued by legitimacy
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threats associated with their country of origin, are forced to take on a greater ownership stake,
and lack the opportunity to rely on a local partner’s existing legitimacy. These EMNCs,
however, may not necessarily be at a disadvantage to compete with established firms. As shown
in the current study, EMNCs with larger ownership stakes experience greater sales growth in
subsequent years. Further examination of the interaction between degrees of institutional
deviance and performance implications can be even more informative. In addition, future studies
of the comparison between AMNCs and EMNCs on their post-acquisition performance can
further reveal differences in the performance implications of their ownership positions. Do
AMNCs, which largely rely on sharing ownership with local partnering firms to mitigate
legitimacy threats, experience better post-acquisition performance than EMNCs that do not have
the option to share ownership with local partners?
Moreover, the United States is chosen as a single developed host market in the current
study. In addition to the merits of the investment environment in the United States market, I
deliberately choose a single target market because the construction of institutional distance is
more straightforward without the complication of multiple host markets. In future studies, the
findings of the current study can be compared with EMNCs’ entry into other developed markets
such as the U.K. or Japan.
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
These findings provide guidelines for practitioners to formulate effective strategies to
respond to the challenges facing EMNCs in developed markets. The three pillars of institutional
distance present different types of legitimacy requirements in the host, developed market.
Additionally, various home market characteristics interact with the three pillars of institutional
distance in very different ways in influencing EMNCs’ ownership decisions. Business executives
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of EMNCs may use the findings of the current study as a reference to formulate their entry
strategy in various developed markets. Which pillar of institutional distance present larger threats
to their individual firm’s entry into the market? Do legitimacy threats need to be a primary
concern or are there other, more important considerations, such as strategic control?
In addition, as the frequency of EMNC acquisitions in developed markets increase,
business executives of developed market firms have an increasing likelihood of either becoming
the target of an EMNC’s acquisition or competing with EMNCs in acquiring other firms. An
understanding of EMNCs’ acquisition pattern can provide invaluable insights when competing
with these newly emergent formidable players in global competition.
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Table 1 Top 100 Non-financial Multinational Companies from Emerging Economies in 2008
Home economy

Corporation

Industry a

Argentina
Brazil

Ternium SA
Vale S.A
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras
Metalurgica Gerdau S.A.
CITIC Group
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company
China National Petroleum Corporation
China State Construction Engineering Corp.
Sinochem Corp.
China National Offshore Oil Corp.
China Communications Construction Co.
Beijing Enterprises Holdings Ltd.
China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd
ZTE Corp.
Lenovo Group
China Minmetals Corp.
TPV Technology Limited
Orascom Telecom Holding
Hutchison Whampoa Limited
Jardine Matheson Holdings Ltd
New World Development Co., Ltd.
China Resources Enterprises
China Merchants Holdings International
First Pacific Company Limited
Shangri-La Asia Limited

Metal and metal products
Mining & quarrying
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Metal and metal products
Diversified
Transport and storage
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Construction and real estate
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Construction and real estate
Diversified
Construction
Other consumer goods
Electrical & electronic equipment
Metal and metal products
Wholesale trade
Telecommunications
Diversified
Diversified
Diversified
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Diversified
Electrical & electronic equipment
Other consumer services

China
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Egypt
Hong Kong, China

Foreign
Assetb
($Millions)
7 063
19 635
15 075
13 658
43 750
28 066
9 409
7 015
6 409
5 247
4 010
3 662
3 146
3 143
2 732
2 269
2 266
6 718
70 762
17 544
9 061
7 371
7 154
6 998
6 587

TNI c (%)

64.5
38.3
16.2
48.6
21
49.9
2.7
16.6
36.8
9.4
12.1
77
9.1
44.2
41.1
11.6
69.8
64.4
82
69.2
37.5
89
96.8
99
61

India
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South Korea

Kuwait

Malaysia

Mexico

Orient Overseas International Ltd
CLP Holdings
Li & Fung Limited
Noble Group Limited
Swire Pacific Limited
Guangdong Investment Limited
Shougang Concord International
Road King Infrastructure Limited
Techtronic Industries Company Limited
Tata Steel Ltd.
Oil And Natural Gas Corporation
Hindalco Industries Limited
Tata Motors Ltd
Suzlon Energy Limited
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Hyundai Motor Company
LG Corp.
STX Corporation
Posco
Zain
National Industries Group Holdings SAK
Agility Public Warehousing Company
Petronas - Petroliam Nasional Bhd
Axiata Group Bhd
YTL Corp. Berhad
Genting Berhad
Sime Darby Berhad
Tanjong Public Limited Company
Cemex S.A.

Transport and storage
Utilities (Electricity, gas and water)
Wholesale trade
Wholesale trade
Business services
Diversified
Metal and metal products
Transport and storage
Other equipments goods
Metal and metal products
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Diversified
Automobile
Diversified
Electrical & electronic equipment
Motor vehicles
Electrical & electronic equipment
Other equipments goods
Metal and metal products
Telecommunications
Diversified
Construction and real estate
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Telecommunications
Utilities (Electricity, gas and water)
Other consumer services
Diversified
Pharmaceuticals
Non-metalic mineral products

6 412
6 071
4 761
4 346
3 903
3 749
2 630
2 428
2 334
16 826
13 477
8 564
6 767
5 310
28 765
28 359
13 256
8 308
5 335
18 746
2 504
2 264
28 447
8 184
7 014
5 139
4 307
2 445
40 258

67.3
35.7
90.3
42.2
37.7
95.1
89.1
90.4
81.8
69.8
23.8
71.6
48.9
75.7
54.2
36.5
43.8
34.5
21.4
61.2
47.5
38.6
29.6
67.7
47.8
47.9
45.7
49.5
81.6
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América Móvil
Telefonos De Mexico S.A. De C.V.
FEMSA-Fomento Economico Mexicano
Philippines
San Miguel Corporation
Qatar
Qatar Telecom
Russian Federation Lukoil
Evraz
Severstal
JSFC Sistema
MMC Norilsk Nickel
VimpelCom
Mechel
TMK
Singapore
Singtel Ltd.
Capitaland Limited
Wilmar International Limited
Flextronics International Ltd.
Fraser & Neave Limited
Keppel Corporation Limited
Neptune Orient Lines Ltd.
South Africa
MTN Group Limited
Sasol Limited
Sappi Limited
Netcare Limited
Steinhoff International holdings
Gold Fields Limited
Medi Clinic Corp. Limited
Naspers Limited
Taiwan
Formosa Plastics Group

Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Food, beverages and tobacco
Food, beverages and tobacco
Telecommunications
Petroleum and natural gas
Metal and metal products
Metal and metal products
Telecommunications
Metal and metal products
Telecommunications
Metal and metal products
Metal and metal products
Telecommunications
Construction and real estate
Food, beverages and tobacco
Electrical & electronic equipment
Food, beverages and tobacco
Diversified
Transport and storage
Telecommunications
Chemicals
Wood and paper products
Other consumer services
Other consumer goods
Metal and metal products
Other consumer services
Other consumer services
Chemicals

10 428
3 948
3 508
2 655
10 598
21 515
11 196
8 066
5 698
4 389
3 726
2 911
2 361
17 326
9 852
7 812
5 338
4 717
3 820
2 640
13 266
6 679
5 933
5 590
5 060
4 839
4 788
3 821
16 937

52.6
28.6
30.3
21.7
69.7
42.2
47.5
30.2
19.1
13.3
21.8
16
27.4
63.2
60.9
58.4
65.2
54.7
38.3
52.3
67.4
29.6
85.2
56.1
56.5
35.7
78.7
55.3
40.9

Thailand
Turkey
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Hon Hai Precision Industries
Asustek Computer Inc
Quanta Computer Inc
Pou Chen Corp.
Acer Inc.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Lt
Chi MEI Optoelectronics
United Microelectronics Corporation
Inventec Company
Compal Electronics Inc
Qisda Corp. (Benq)
Wistron Corp.
PTT Public Company Limited
Enka Insaat ve Sanayi
Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri AS
Abu Dhabi National Energy Company

United Arab
Emirates
Venezuela
Petróleos De Venezuela
Source: UNCTAD/Erasmus University database
a

Electrical & electronic equipment
Electrical & electronic equipment
Electrical & electronic equipment
Other consumer goods
Electrical & electronic equipment
Electrical & electronic equipment
Electrical & electronic equipment
Electrical & electronic equipment
Electrical & electronic equipment
Other consumer goods
Electrical & electronic equipment
Other equipments goods
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Construction and real estate
Telecommunications
Utilities (Electricity, gas and water)

14 664
6 746
6 711
4 553
4 455
3 813
3 070
2 901
2 874
2 573
2 441
2 316
2 525
3 540
2 263
13 519

58.1
55.9
41.6
71.6
79.9
30.8
11.9
52.7
61.2
43.9
53.5
42.7
10
46.5
21.2
69.5

Petroleum expl./ref./distr.

19 244

21.5

Industry classification for companies follows the United States Standard Industrial Classification as used by the United States

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
b

All data are based on the companies' annual reports unless otherwise stated.

c

TNI, the Transnationlity Index, is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to

total sales and foreign employment to total employment.

Table 2 Emerging-Market Multinational Companies’ (EMNCs) Competitive Advantages
Advantage

Example

References

Cost advantage derived
from the factor endowment
of home country

The access to low-cost labor
pools; local knowledge of
serving emerging market
customers

Aguiar, Bailey, Bhattacharya,
Bradtke, Juan, Hemerling, et
al. 2009; Mathews, 2002,
2006

Leveraging connections with
AMNCs

Working as suppliers for
established MNCs

Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009;
Mathews, 2002, 2006

Institutional
entrepreneurship

Adaptability to institutional
environment with less clear
formal institutional rules

Caves, 1996; Lall, 1983;
Lecraw, 1993; Guillen, &
Garcia-Canal, 2009;
Hoskisson, et al., 2000

Network-ties with other
EMNCs

Business group affiliation

Leff, 1978; Gullien, 2000;
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Table 3 EMNC’s Legitimacy in a Developed Market

Regulative
pillar

Cognitive
pillar

Normative
pillar

Definition (adapted from
Kostova, 1997; Scott, 1995)
National differences in the
existing laws and rules which
promote certain types of
behaviors and restrict others

National differences in the
established cognitive structures,
reflected in national cultural
differences
National differences in the
societal values and norms in the
institutional field
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Examples: EMNC’s potential challenges to
establish legitimacy in a developed market
Listing and registration in a stock market
(Karolyi, 1998; Marosi, & Massoud, 2008);
accounting standards and investor protection
procedures (Pagano, Roell, & Zechner, 2002);
food and safety requirements; labor law;
environmental protection procedures
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999)
Cultural dimensions, such as individualism or
collectivism (Hofstede, 1980)

Ethical beliefs in promoting corporate social
responsibility (Tan & Wang, 2011); corporate
governance practices to improve board
independence (Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley,
2010); organizational structures (Suchman,
1995; Zaheer, 1995); societal values in basic
human rights, such as freedom of speech
(Tan & Wang, 2011)

Table 4 Equity-based Entry Mode
Establishment mode

Ownership
mode

Greenfield*

Acquisition

Shared

1. Greenfield JV

3. Partial acquisition

Full

2. Greenfield WOS

4. Full acquisition

*Greenfield operations refer to a foreign firm’s investment to start the
foreign operations from ground up.
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Table 5 EMNC’s Entry Mode and Performance Research
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Authors

Sample

Independent variables

Major results

Aybar &
Ficici (2009)

433 merger and
acquisitions by
58 EMNCs

Firm size, target is privately
owned, value of the transaction
to the bidder’s market value,
level of development of the
institutional infrastructure,
geographic and/or cultural
proximity, level of control
(percentage of shares acquired)

On average, cross-border expansions of EMNCs through
acquisitions do not create value, but point to value destruction
for more than half of the transactions analyzed. Target size,
ownership structure of the target (private vs. public) and
structure of the bidder (diversified vs. non-diversified)
positively affect the bidder value, high-tech nature of the
bidder and pursuit of targets in related industries negatively
affect the bidder value. The stake pursued in the target firm
and cultural distance positively affects value, but international
experience and enhanced corporate governance do not.

Chiao, Lo, &
Yu (2010)

819 Taiwanese
firms investing
in China

Firm-specific assets,
international experience,
whether a firm is investing
abroad in pursuit of a particular
customer, whether a firm seeks
complementary assets abroad,
and the perceived institutional
differences

Firms with more firm-specific assets, less need for
complementary assets, greater parental R&D capability, more
international experience, and the tendency to following their
customers are more likely to enter foreign markets by means of
wholly-owned subsidiaries. The firm’s perception of
institutional difference weakens the positive relationship
between complementary assets pursuit and joint venture
because of great difficulty to coordinate with partners.

Cui & Jiang
(2009)

138 Chinese
firms

Host competition, host industry
growth, asset seeking
motivation, global strategic
infrastructure, industry
groupings, R&D intensity,
parent firm diversity, subsidiary

Chinese firms prefer wholly owned subsidiary entry mode
when they adopt a global strategy, face severe host industry
competition, and seek strategic assets. A joint venture is
preferred when Chinese firms are investing in a high growth
host market.

size, entry timing
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Demirbag,
McGuinness
& Altay
(2010)

Turkish firms
investing in the
Central Asian
Republics

Perceptions of arbitrariness,
attitude towards FDI, risk of
intervention, political &
economic uncertainties,
international relations of the host
country, law and order
uncertainties, size of operation,
corruption, entry route to the
host country, resource
dependency

Greater ethical-societal uncertainties result in a preference for
joint venture over wholly owned subsidiary. There is a strong
correlation between the perceived risk of intervention and joint
venture entry mode, and limited support for the Uppsala
internationalization model.

Filatotchev,
Strange,
Piesse &
Lien (2007)

Taiwan FDI in
China; various
industries

Parent corporate governance,
network relationship

The choice of equity stake in an affiliate depends upon the
extent of family and institutional share ownership in the parent
company. High-commitment entry is found to be positively
associated with the affiliate being located in areas with strong
economic, cultural and historic links with the parent company.
Furthermore, the entry mode and location decisions appear to
be interrelated—the parent's equity stake in the affiliate
depending, inter alia, upon the location within China, and the
favored location depending, inter alia, upon the equity stake.

Gubbi,
Aulakh, Ray,
Sarkar &
Chittoor
(2010)

425 crossborder M&A by
Indian firms

Firm age, firm size, average net
profit margin, average export
intensity, average leverage,
annual market capitalization,
foreign subsidiary, private target,
business group affiliation,

The magnitude of value created will be higher when the target
firms are located in advanced economic and institutional
environments, country markets that carry the promise of higher
quality of resources, and therefore, offering stronger
complementarity to the existing capabilities of emerging
economy firms

manufacturing sector
1,355 Chinese
private
enterprises

Ownership-specific advantages;
market imperfection residuals

Their ownership-specific advantages in areas such as corporate
governance, inherited advantage from mergers and
acquisitions of state-owned companies, and inward
internationalization increase the level of outward
internationalization. Market imperfection residuals, such as
industry structure uncertainty, also propel the inclination for
internationalization.

Malhotra,
Sivakumar,
& Zhu
(2011)

A comparison
of cross-border
acquisitions by
firms from the
United States
and 18
emerging
countries

Cultural distance; market
potential

(1) firms from both the United States and emerging countries
target countries that are culturally closer to their home
countries, (2) a strong interaction effect occurs between market
potential and cultural distance for emerging country firms as
the market potential increases (i.e., at high market potential,
firms from emerging economies are willing to overlook
cultural distance), (3) no interaction effect occurs between
market potential and cultural distance for U.S. firms, and (4)
different cultural dimensions affect the market entry strategies
of U.S. firms and firms from emerging countries.

Mulok, Raja,
& Ainuddin
(2010)

13 Malaysian
MNEs

Cultural distance

Wholly-owned subsidiaries do not perform better than joint
ventures; Wholly-owned subsidiaries are preferred over joint
ventures in a cultural distant host country; Malaysian MNEs
perform better when they form wholly-owned subsidiaries
entering culturally similar countries and when they form joint
ventures entering culturally dissimilar countries.
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Luo, Zhao,
Wang, & Xi
(2011)

Sim &
Pandian
(2003)

12 case studies
of Taiwanese
and
Singaporean
MNEs

Firm size, internationalization
motives

The largest textile firm (Taiwanese firm TC) invested in a
joint-venture in Canada to produce feedstock (ethylene glycol)
from natural gas—a backward integrative motive.

Sun, Peng,
Ren, & Yan
(2012)

1526 crossborder M&As
by Chinese and
Indian MNEs
from 2000 to
2008

National-industry factor
endowments; dynamic learning;
value creation; reconfiguration
of value chain; institutional
facilitation and constraints

P1: Comparatively, China will have intensive cross-border
M&As in manufacturing industries, and India will have
intensive cross-border M&As in service industries. P2:
Comparatively, Chinese MNEs prefer to acquire companies in
Asia, and Indian MNEs prefer to acquire companies in the
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United States and in Europe. P3: Both Chinese and Indian
MNEs prefer friendly rather than hostile M&As when
structuring M&A deals. Indian MNEs are more likely to adopt
tender offer modes in M&A deals than Chinese MNEs because
Indian MNEs’ M&As deals are more likely to occur in the
United States and Europe than Chinese MNEs’ M&A
deals.P4: Chinese MNEs prefer to acquire natural resource
intensive firms, while Indian MNEs prefer to acquire
technology intensive firms in cross-border M&As. Chinese
MNEs prefer backward integration in cross-border M&As,
while Indian MNEs prefer forward integration in cross-border
M&As. P5: In large-scale cross-border M&As, Chinese stateowned enterprises generally play the lead role among Chinese
MNEs, and Indian private enterprises play the lead role among
Indian MNEs.

Table 6 Summary of Hypotheses
Phase
Phase One
AMNCs &
EMNCs
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Phase Two
EMNCs

Main Predictors
Institutional distance

Hypotheses
H1: For AMNCs, institutional distance, including regulative distance (H1a), cognitive
distance (H1b), and normative distance (H1c), is negatively associated with their
ownership position in a cross-border merger and acquisition event in a developed
market.
H2: For EMNCs, institutional distance, including regulative distance (H2a), cognitive
distance (H2b), and normative distance (H2c), is positively associated with their
ownership position in a cross-border merger and acquisition event in a developed
market.
Differential effects of three
H3: For AMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional distance on
pillars of institutional distance ownership position has the least influence among the three pillars of institutional
distance.
H4: For EMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional distance on
ownership position is the strongest among the three pillars of institutional distance.
Home market characteristics
H5: Human capital development in an EMNC’s home country moderates the
relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such
that human capital development, including skilled labor (H5a) and innovative capacity
(H5b), decreases the influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership
position in a developed market.
H6: The global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country moderates the
relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such
that the global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country decreases the influence of
institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership position in a developed market.
H7: The historical connections of an EMNC’s home country to the host developed
market moderates the relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s
ownership position such that the historical connections of an EMNC’s home country
decreases the influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership position in
a developed market.
Firm characteristics
H8: The extent of an EMNC’s market leading position moderates the relationship
between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an
EMNC’s market leading position decreases the influence of institutional distance on

Firm performance
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its ownership position in a developed market.
H9: An EMNC’s international presence moderates the relationship between
institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an EMNC’s
international presence decreases the influence of institutional distance on its
ownership position in a developed market.
H10: Media coverage of an EMNC moderates the relationship between institutional
distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that media coverage in a developed
market decreases the influence of institutional distance on its ownership position in a
developed market.
H11: An EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market moderates the relationship
between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an
EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market decreases the influence of institutional
distance on its ownership position in a developed market.
H12a: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a higher ownership position
experience better post-acquisition overall firm performance.
H12b: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a lower ownership position
experience better post-acquisition overall firm performance.

Table 7 Acquirers’ Country of Origin in Cross-border Merger and Acquisition Events with the
Target Firm in the United States from 2005 to 2011
AMNCs’ M&As*
Canada(376); U.K.(222); Japan(59);
France(58); Australia(57); Germany(56);
Switzerland(36); Netherlands(33);
Israel(28); Sweden(25); Spain(20);
Ireland(14); Norway(14); Italy(13);
Denmark(11); New Zealand(8);
Austria(7); Belgium(5); Finland(5);
Greece(3); Luxembourg(3); Poland(2);
Portugal(2); Estonia(1); Iceland(1)

EMNCs’ M&As*
India(53); China(21); Bermuda(16); Hong
Kong(15); Singapore(14); South
Korea**(13); Russian Fed(11); Taiwan(11);
Brazil(10); British Virgin Islands(6);
Colombia(5);; Mexico**(5); Bahamas(4);
Guernsey(4); Malaysia(4); Cyprus(3);
Philippines(3); South Africa(3);
Argentina(2); Chile**(2); Kuwait(2);
Thailand(2); Turkey**(2); United Arab
Emirates(2); Vietnam(2); Barbados(1);
Belize(1); Cayman Islands(1); Georgia(1);
Latvia(1); Lebanon(1); Macau(1);
Mauritius(1); Nigeria(1); Panama(1); Puerto
Rico(1); Zimbabwe(1)

*The number in the brackets following the nation indicates the frequency of M&As from the
country in the sample period between 2005 and 2011.
**These countries meet only one criterion to be classified as developed markets, and therefore
these countries are classified as emerging markets in the current study.
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Table 8 Measure of Normative Pillar of Institutional Distance
Corporate practice Survey items
Corporate
How would you characterize
governance
corporate governance by
investors and boards of directors
in your country?
Employee training To what extent do companies in
your country invest in training
and employee development?
Customer
How well do companies in your
orientation
country treat customers?
Buyer
sophistication

In your country, how do buyers
make purchasing decisions?

Pay and
productivity

To what extent is pay in your
country related to productivity?

Reliance on
professional
management

In your country, who holds senior
management positions?

Production
process
sophistication

In your country, how
sophisticated are production
processes

Willingness to
delegate authority

In your country, how do you
assess the willingness to delegate
authority to subordinates?
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Scale
1 = management has little
accountability to investors and boards;
7 = investors and boards exert strong
supervision of management decisions
1 = hardly at all; 7 = to a great extent

1 = generally treat their customers
badly; 7 = are highly responsive to
customers and customer retention
1 = based solely on the lowest price; 7
= based on a sophisticated analysis of
performance attributes
1 = not related to worker productivity;
7 = strongly related to worker
productivity
1 = usually relatives or friends without
regard to merit; 7 = mostly
professional managers chosen for
merit and qualifications
1 = not at all – labor-intensive
methods or previous generations of
process technology prevail; 7 = highly
– the world's best and most efficient
process technology prevails
1 = low – top management controls all
important decisions; 7 = high –
authority is mostly delegated to
business unit heads and other lowerlevel managers

Table 9 Measures of Human Capital
Measure
Skilled
labor

Innovative
capacity

Survey items
How would you assess the quality of
management or business schools in your
country?
How would you rate the level of access
to the Internet in schools in your
country?
How would you assess the quality of
math and science education in your
country's schools?
How well does the educational system
in your country meet the needs of a
competitive economy?
To what extent are scientists and
engineers available in your country?
How would you assess the quality of
scientific research institutions in your
country?
To what extent do business and
universities collaborate on research and
development (R&D) in your country?
To what extent are the latest
technologies available in your country?
In your country, how do companies
obtain technology?
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Scale
1=”very poor” to 7=”excellent—
among the best in the world.”
1=”very limited”; 7=”extensive”
1 = “poor”; 7 = “excellent - among the
best in the world”
1 = “not well at all”; 7 = “very well”
1=”not at all”; 7=”widely available”
1=”very poor”; 7=” the best in their
field internationally”
1 = “do not collaborate at all”; 7 =
“collaborate extensively”
1 = “not available”; 7 = “widely
available”
1 = “exclusively from licensing or
imitating foreign companies”; 7 = “by
conducting formal research and
pioneering their own new products
and processes”

Table 10 Country scores of religious distance and language distance from the U.S.

Country
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Kenya
Kuwait
Malaysia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Russian Fed
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea

Language distance
-0.69
0.27
-0.69
0.53
-0.69
0.53
-2.43
0.53
-2.43
0.05
0.53
-0.69
-0.69
-0.69
-2.43
0.27
0.05
-2.43
-2.43
0.53

Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
Utd Arab Em
Vietnam
Zimbabwe

0.53
0.53
0.53
0.05
0.53
-2.43

Religious distance M&A deals counts
-1.29
2
-1.29
15
-1.29
3
1.01
43
-1.29
4
-0.51
34
1.27
169
0.76
2
-1.03
1
0.76
3
0.76
6
-1.29
24
-1.03
1
-1.29
1
-1.29
5
-0.53
14
0.76
2
1.01
24
-0.78
11
-0.52
1.01
1.27
1.02
0.76
1.01
-1.03
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46
34
2
1
2
1
1

Table 11 Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlation among Variables Used in the Regression in
Phase One (N=1650)

1. Ownership position
2. Year2006Dummy
3. Year2007Dummy

Mean SD
90.1 23.79
0.15
0.35
0.19
0.39

1
0.02
0.04

4. Year2008Dummy

0.17

0.37

5. Year2009Dummy

0.11

0.31 -0.1**

6. Year2010Dummy

0.13

0.34 -0.04*

7. Year2011Dummy
8. Total assets
9. High tech industry
10. Geographic
distance
11. Home country
status
12. Regulative
distance

0.13
6.43
0.15

0.11

0.34
0
2.8 -0.04*
0.35 0.08**
0.61 0.10**
0.32 0.12**

7.77

7.86

13. Cognitive distance
14. Normative
distance

1.09

8.59

2.92
6

7. Year2011Dummy
8. Total assets

0.03

2

-0.2**
0.19**
0.15**
0.16**
0.16**
-0.05*
0
0.06**
0.03

3

0.22**
0.17**
0.19**
0.19**
0.02
0

4

0.16**
0.18** 0.14**
0.18** 0.14**
0.13** -0.03
0.03
-0.03

0.09** 0.06**
0.02

-0.02

0.01
0.01
0
0.04
1.21 0.16** -0.05* 0.01
0.04
2.82 0.11** 0.09** 0.11** 0.08**
7

8

9

10

5

11

-0.03
0
-0.02
0.02
0
12

13

0.15**
-0.02 -0.04*
0.01 0.06** 0.12**
0
0.09** 0.42** 0.16**

9. High tech industry
10. Geographic
distance
11. Home country
status
0
0.01
0.01
0.04 0.33**
12. Regulative
distance
-0.02
0.01
0.04
0.02
0
0
13. Cognitive distance 0.04
-0.03 0.34** 0.06** 0.61** 0.51**
14. Normative
distance
0.10** 0.13** 0.12** 0.01 0.24** 0.54**
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0.02
0.03

0.34**

*p-value<0.05 **p-value <0.001; Both total assets and geographic distance variables have been
transformed into natural logs.
“Home country status”: 1=emerging market; 0=developed market
“Total assets” refers to the acquiring firm's total assets prior to the acquisition.
“High-tech industry” refers to whether the acquiring firm is in high-technology industries. 0=no;
1=yes

127

Table 12 Regression Result of the Moderation Effect of Acquirers’ Home Country Status

Year 2006 dummy
Year 2007 dummy
Year 2008 dummy
Year 2009 dummy
Year 2010 dummy
Year 2011 dummy
Total Assets
High Tech Industry
Geographic Distance
Home Country Status
Regulative Distance
Cognitive Distance
Normative Distance
Home Country Status X Regulative
Distance
Home Country Status X Cognitive
Distance
Home Country Status X Normative
Distance
Observations
Adjusted R2
Change in R2 from the previous
model
N=1650
*p-value<0.05 **p-value <0.001

Model
1
-0.041
-0.017
-0.028
-0.134
-0.087
-0.054
0.014
0.101
-0.125

**
**

**
**

Model
2
-0.042
-0.038
-0.034
-0.136
-0.097
-0.066
0.024
0.095
-0.038
-0.009
0.005
-0.111
-0.079

**
**

**

**
*

Model
3
-0.047
-0.042
-0.034
-0.137
-0.099
-0.069
0.017
0.094
-0.008
-0.092
0.004
-0.115
-0.143

**
**
*
**
**

**
**

0.008
-0.007
0.154
1650
0.03
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**

1650
0.045

1650
0.051

0.018 **

0.007 **

Table 13 Subsample Regression Analyses for EMNCs and AMNCs
AMNCs
Year 2006 dummy
-0.043
Year 2007 dummy
-0.053
Year 2008 dummy
-0.031
Year 2009 dummy
-0.131
Year 2010 dummy
-0.12
Year 2011 dummy
-0.064
Total Assets
0.028
High Tech Industry
0.088
Geographic Distance
0.017
Regulative Distance
-0.006
Cognitive Distance
-0.148
Normative Distance
-0.137
Observations
1465
2
Adjusted R
0.038
*p-value<0.05 **p-value <0.01

**
**

**

**
**

EMNCs
-0.162
-0.147
-0.123
-0.274 *
-0.247 *
-0.36 **
-0.061
0.11
-0.184
0.043
-0.066
-0.053
185
0.065
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Table 14 Merger and Acquisitions by EMNCs in Phase Two by Acquisition Years and
Acquirer’s Home Country
Acquisition years
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total
Anguilla
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Argentina

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

Bahamas

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

3

Bermuda

1

5

6

7

2

4

4

29

Brazil

0

2

0

3

1

6

3

15

British Virgin

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

2

Cayman Islands

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Chile

2

0

0

0

0

0

1

3

China

2

1

5

11

5

9

10

43

Colombia

2

1

0

0

0

1

0

4

Cyprus

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

2

Guernsey

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

3

Hong Kong

3

11

4

4

2

3

7

34

India

25

24

45

24

14

22

15

169

Indonesia

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

2

Isle of Man

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Jersey

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

2

Kenya

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

Kuwait

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

3

Malaysia

0

1

2

0

1

1

1

6

Mexico

2

8

0

3

2

2

7

24

Neth Antilles

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

2

Panama

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

Peru

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Philippines

0

0

2

2

1

0

0

5

Russian Federation

0

1

1

9

3

0

0

14

Saudi Arabia

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

2

Singapore

4

5

5

4

1

5

0

24

South Africa

1

0

5

3

0

1

1

11

South Korea

2

5

6

5

12

9

7

46

Taiwan

3

4

4

10

7

4

2

34
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Thailand

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

2

Turkey

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Utd Arab Emirates

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

2

Vietnam

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

Zimbabwe

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

Total

52

74

90

90

57

71

63

497

131

132

Table 15 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations in Phase Two
Mean
SD
N
1
1. Ownership position
84.82
29.11
467
2. Total assets
6776800 22502900
455 -0.14**
3. High tech industry
0.46
0.50
496 0.17**
4. Geographic distance
9.20
0.57
495 0.01
5. Regulative distance
13.28
12.22
456 0
6. Cognitive distance
2.72
1.29
431 -0.20**
7. Normative distance
5.93
3.78
497 0
8. Innovation capacity
17.21
1.94
453 0.01
9. Skilled labor
18.77
2.77
454 0.08
10. Free trade
0.11
0.32
497 0.06
11. Religious distance
0.45
0.97
451 0.18**
12. Language distance
-0.98
1.40
451 -0.17**
13. Internet users
28.67
26.53
452 -0.18**
14. Foreign market size
5.91
0.58
450 -0.03
15. Market position
1.00
2.21
461 -0.02
16. Crosslisting
0.27
0.44
497 0.09
17. Media coverage
0.45
0.51
497 0
18. Geographic dispersion
3.48
2.06
367 0
19. Sales growth t+1
0.43
1.97
401 0.07
20. Sales growth t+2
2.47
32.42
338 0.03
21. Sales growth t+3
1.05
2.54
270 0.14*
22. Stock price t+1
0.33
2.19
391 -0.08
23. Stock price t+2
0.49
2.67
331 -0.09
24. Stock price t+3
0.12
1.25
266 -0.02
25. Income growth t+1
1.15
14.55
407 0.04
26. Income growth t+2
-1.76
46.02
343 -0.02

2

3

4

5

6

-0.08
-0.12*
-0.01
0.12*
0.02
-0.05
-0.14**
-0.02
-0.24**
0.19**
0.17**
-0.03
0.59**
0.14**
0.19**
0.1
-0.05
-0.12*
-0.13*
-0.02
-0.01
-0.04
-0.01
-0.04

0.23**
0
-0.10*
-0.14**
0.24**
0.28**
-0.11*
0.34**
-0.19**
-0.04
0.15**
0.05
-0.04
-0.07
-0.12*
0.09
-0.05
0.12*
-0.03
-0.05
-0.05
0.03
0.05

0.04
-0.07
-0.04
0.47**
0.55**
-0.4**
0.63**
-0.26**
-0.02
0.18**
-0.29**
-0.37**
0
-0.22**
0.08
0.04
0.16**
0
-0.03
0.01
0.06
-0.02

-0.32**
0.62**
-0.43**
-0.56**
-0.39**
0.35**
-0.33**
-0.74**
0.31**
-0.16**
-0.19**
-0.14**
-0.26**
0.08
0.18**
0.16*
0.07
0.1
0.06
0.06
-0.18**

-0.3**
0.48**
0.21**
0.07
-0.33**
0.75**
0.73**
0.14**
0.22**
0.07
0
0.24**
-0.12*
-0.15**
-0.21**
0.07
0.08
-0.04
-0.05
-0.05

27. Income growth t+3
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8. Innovation capacity
9. Skilled labor
10. Free trade
11. Religious distance
12. Language distance
13. Internet users
14. Foreign market size
15. Market position
16. Crosslisting
17. Media coverage
18. Geographic dispersion
19. Sales growth t+1
20. Sales growth t+2
21. Sales growth t+3
22. Stock price t+1
23. Stock price t+2
24. Stock price t+3
25. Income growth t+1
26. Income growth t+2
27. Income growth t+3

17. Media coverage
18. Geographic dispersion

0.64

7
-0.73**
-0.72**
0.09
-0.14**
-0.15**
-0.65**
-0.1*
-0.16**
-0.24**
-0.07
-0.03
0.04
0.14*
0.14*
0.09
0.15**
0.15*
0.05
-0.13*
0.02

13.50

277 0.06

8
0.84**
-0.08
0.35**
0.2**
0.58**
0.22**
-0.01
-0.1*
-0.03
-0.14*
0
-0.14*
0
-0.03
-0.08
-0.05
-0.01
0.14*
0

16
17
0.21**
0.32** 0.27**

-0.03

0.08

0.04

0.01

0.02

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

-0.02
0.42**
-0.01
0.49**
0.14**
-0.07
-0.09
0.02
-0.11*
0.03
-0.1
0.03
-0.04
-0.09
-0.04
-0.03
0.09
0

-0.29**
-0.12**
0.12*
-0.29**
-0.02
0.16**
0.01
0.18**
-0.05
-0.02
-0.1
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.03
0.01
-0.04

-0.48**
-0.37**
0.44**
-0.27**
-0.23**
-0.08
-0.46**
0.11*
-0.08
0.2**
-0.04
-0.09
0.01
0.04
0.09
0.01

0.65**
0.1399
0.27**
0.17**
0.08
0.3**
-0.11*
-0.06
-0.2**
0.04
0.06
-0.02
-0.06
0.04
0.06

-0.04
0.3**
0.14**
0.12*
0.27**
-0.11*
-0.05
-0.22**
-0.01
-0.01
-0.05
-0.08
0.04
-0.01

-0.05
0.1*
0.04
-0.12*
0
-0.27**
0.06
0.05
0.04
-0.03
0.02
0.26**
0.08

0.35**
0.19**
0.22**
-0.08
-0.1
-0.15*
-0.03
-0.04
-0.01
-0.04
-0.05
-0.03

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19. Sales growth t+1
20. Sales growth t+2
21. Sales growth t+3
22. Stock price t+1
23. Stock price t+2
24. Stock price t+3
25. Income growth t+1
26. Income growth t+2
27. Income growth t+3

-0.08
-0.04
-0.09
-0.07
-0.08
-0.13*
-0.05
0.02
-0.04

-0.09
-0.05
-0.08
-0.03
-0.02
0.01
-0.04
0.05
-0.03

-0.13*
-0.09
-0.14*
0.07
0.06
-0.19**
-0.06
-0.03
0.02

0.02
0.75**
0.04
0
-0.04
0.05
0.04
-0.02

0.84**
-0.03
0.08
0.01
-0.01
-0.98**
0.02

0.2**
0.17**
0.13*
0.06
-0.01
0.04

0.93**
0.39**
0.03
0.03
0.09

0.58**
0.04
-0.07
0.13*

0.03
0.01 0.01
0.1 0.3**

-0.1
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Table 16 Three Pillars of Institutional Distance and EMNCs’ Ownership Position in Phase Two
Model 1
Year 2006 dummy
-0.053
Year 2007 dummy
-0.047
Year 2008 dummy
-0.127
Year 2009 dummy
-0.196
Year 2010 dummy
-0.165
Year 2011 dummy
-0.125
Total Assets
-0.123
High Tech Industry
0.162
Geographic Distance
-0.045
Regulative Distance
-0.012
Cognitive Distance
Normative Distance
Observations
384

**
*
^
*
**

Model 2
-0.038
-0.048
-0.09
-0.158
-0.153
-0.115
-0.107
0.147
-0.032

*
*
*
**

Model 3
-0.055
-0.046
-0.16
-0.212
-0.153
-0.124
-0.113
0.184
-0.061

-0.162 *
364

Adjusted R2
0.052
0.08
^p-value<0.10; *p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01
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-0.002
423
0.063

*
**
*
^
*
**

Model 4
-0.026
-0.011
-0.057
-0.132
-0.126
-0.087
-0.105 *
0.149 **
-0.01
-0.097
-0.18 **
0.046
364
0.079

Table 17 Human Capital Development in EMNCs’ Home Country

Year 2006 dummy
Year 2007 dummy
Year 2008 dummy
Year 2009 dummy
Year 2010 dummy
Year 2011 dummy
Total Assets
High Tech Industry
Geographic Distance
Regulative Distance
Cognitive Distance
Normative Distance
Skilled Labor
Innovation Capacity
Regulative Distance X
Skilled Labor
Regulative Distance X
Innovation Capacity
Cognitive Distance X
Skilled Labor
Cognitive Distance X
Innovation Capacity
Normative Distance X
Skilled Labor
Normative Distance X
Innovation Capacity
Observations

Model 1 Model 2
-0.043
-0.054
-0.042
-0.047
-0.117
-0.137^
-0.183* -0.193**
-0.165* -0.186*
-0.131
-0.142*
-0.098^ -0.104*
0.15** 0.162**
-0.062
-0.123
0.035
0.188*

0.22^
-0.18^

0.189
-0.111

Model 3
-0.038
-0.035
-0.052
-0.127^
-0.126
-0.095
-0.094^
0.128*
-0.128^

Model 4 Model 5
-0.038
-0.034
-0.01
-0.011
-0.012
-0.093
-0.097
-0.165*
-0.076
-0.14
-0.055
-0.105
-0.1^
-0.1^
0.133*
0.154**
-0.224*
-0.046

-0.219**

-0.262**

0.133
0.022

0.055
0.291^

0.05
0.206^
-0.152

Model 6
-0.04
0.009
-0.078
-0.154^
-0.129
-0.077
-0.104*
0.166**
-0.003

0.102
0.158
-0.086

-0.283*
0.145
-0.008
-0.212^
-0.232*

381

381

Adjusted R2
0.058
0.068
2
Change in R from the
previous model
0.015
^p-value<0.10; *p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01
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364

364

381

0.165
381

0.085

0.103

0.058

0.064

0.023

0.011

Table 18 Global Connectedness of EMNCs’ Home Country

Year 2006 dummy
Year 2007 dummy
Year 2008 dummy
Year 2009 dummy
Year 2010 dummy
Year 2011 dummy
Total Assets
High Tech Industry
Geographic Distance
Regulative Distance
Cognitive Distance
Normative Distance
Internet User
Foreign Market Size
Regulative Distance
X Internet Users
Regulative Distance
X Foreign Market
Size
Cognitive Distance
X Internet Users
Cognitive Distance
X Foreign Market
Size
Normative Distance
X Internet Users
Normative Distance
X Foreign Market
Size
Observations

Model 1
-0.046
-0.049
-0.095
-0.139
-0.125
-0.081
-0.07
0.152**
-0.023
-0.294**

Model 2
-0.045
-0.03
-0.079
-0.111
-0.119
-0.061
-0.061
0.157**
-0.109
-0.028

Model 3 Model 4
-0.063
-0.082
-0.08
-0.104
-0.13* -0.185*
-0.197* -0.225**
-0.194^ -0.233*
-0.155^ -0.199*
-0.106**
-0.086
0.15 0.169**
-0.041^
-0.035
-0.159

-0.35***
0.069

-0.309***
-0.044

0.006
0.032

Model 5
-0.116
-0.238*
-0.231**
-0.244**
-0.261**
-0.217*
-0.079
0.13*
-0.141*

Model 6
-0.078
-0.169
-0.174^
-0.189*
-0.217*
-0.163^
-0.067
0.126*
-0.131^

-0.292**
0.098 -0.309***
0.097
-0.006

-0.299*
-0.384***
0.026

-0.151^

-0.257*

0.11^
-0.182**

-0.092
-0.134*

377

361

361

377

-0.058
377

Adjusted R
0.096
0.104
2
Change in R from
the previous model
^p-value<0.10; *p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01

0.078

0.097

0.086

0.094

377

2
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0.023*

0.013^

Table 19 Historical Connections of EMNCs’ Home Country with the U.S.
Model 1
-0.029
-0.029
-0.082
-0.152*
-0.147*
-0.102
-0.07
0.11*
-0.124
-0.076
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Year 2006 dummy
Year 2007 dummy
Year 2008 dummy
Year 2009 dummy
Year 2010 dummy
Year 2011 dummy
Total Assets
High Tech Industry
Geographic Distance
Regulative Distance
Cognitive Distance
Normative Distance
Religious Distance
0.213*
Language Distance
-0.065
Free Trade Agreement with the U.S.
0.058
Regulative Distance X Religious
Distance
Regulative Distance X Language Distance
Regulative Distance X Free Trade Agreement
Cognitive Distance X Religious
Distance
Cognitive Distance X Language
Distance
Cognitive Distance X Free Trade Agreement
Normative Distance X Religious
Distance
Normative Distance X Language Distance

Model 2
-0.027
-0.025
-0.075
-0.15*
-0.149*
-0.107
-0.069
0.11*
-0.184
0.028

Model 3
-0.036
-0.044
-0.086
-0.159*
-0.152*
-0.122
-0.085
0.127*
-0.14*
-0.169*

0.201*
-0.021
-0.038

0.198*
0.083

Model 4
-0.021
-0.013
-0.061
-0.129^
-0.139^
-0.104
-0.078
0.136*
-0.178*

Model 5
-0.016
-0.024
-0.056
-0.125^
-0.136^
-0.087
-0.09^
0.135*
0.079

Model 6
-0.018
-0.026
-0.059
-0.125^
-0.139^
-0.087
-0.096^
0.138*
0.007

Model 7
-0.02
-0.014
-0.079
-0.147^
-0.138^
-0.088
-0.075
0.121*
-0.026

Model 8
-0.027
-0.019
-0.087
-0.154^
-0.143
-0.09
-0.076
0.12*
-0.034

0.029
0.172*
-0.019
0.14^

0.036
0.173*
-0.018
0.112

-0.091 -0.171** -0.182**
0.351*
0.141
0.169*

0.108

0.064
-0.064
-0.199
-0.122
-0.279*
0.062
-0.053
-0.017

Normative Distance X Free Trade Agreement
Observations
Adjusted R2
Change in R2 from the previous model
^p-value<0.10; *p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01

379

379

364

364

364

364

379

-0.038
379

0.081

0.076

0.088

0.11

0.094

0.092

0.079

0.073

0.003

0.026**

0.001

0.001
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Table 20 EMNCs’ Firm Characteristics

Year 2006 dummy
Year 2007 dummy
Year 2008 dummy
Year 2009 dummy
Year 2010 dummy
Year 2011 dummy
Total Assets
High Tech Industry
Geographic Distance
Regulative Distance
Cognitive Distance
Normative Distance
Market Position
International presence
Crosslisting
Media Coverage
Regulative Distance X
Market Position
Regulative Distance X
International Presence
Regulative Distance X
Crosslisting
Regulative Distance X
Media Coverage
Cognitive Distance X
Market Position
Cognitive Distance X
International Presence
Cognitive Distance X
Crosslisting
Cognitive Distance X
Media Coverage
Normative Distance X
Market Position
Normative Distance X
International Presence
Normative Distance X
Crosslisting
Normative Distance X
Media Coverage
Observations

Model 1
-0.043
-0.008
-0.186*
-0.183*
-0.158
-0.162
-0.099
0.211*
0.003*
-0.001

-0.078
0.075
0.166*
-0.084

Model 2
-0.033
0
-0.18*
-0.183*
-0.156
-0.158
-0.073
0.218*
-0.016
0.019

-0.128
0.085
0.148*
-0.078

Model 3
-0.035
0.002
-0.157
-0.169*
-0.158
-0.169
-0.115
0.191**
0.027

Model 4
-0.034
0.002
-0.167
-0.164
-0.168
-0.172
-0.146
0.184*
0.025

-0.04

-0.014

-0.03
0.085
0.168*
-0.115

0.075
0.097
0.139
-0.114

Model 5
-0.046
-0.008
-0.206*
-0.226**
-0.143
-0.154
-0.107
0.237**
-0.008

Model 6
-0.042
0.027
-0.189*
-0.212**
-0.121
-0.133
-0.089
0.258**
-0.017

-0.014
-0.075
0.065
0.123
-0.016

0.017
-0.125
0.085
0.108
-0.021

-0.044
-0.026
-0.057
0.003
-0.143
0.012
0.114
0.018
-0.06
-0.024
-0.078

293

293
140

279

279

329

-0.127*
329

Adjusted R2
0.096
0.089
Change in R2 from the
previous model
0.006
^p-value<0.10; *p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01
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0.102

0.101
0.012

0.102

0.119
0.027*

Table 21 Hypotheses and results
Phase
Phase One
AMNCs &
EMNCs

Phase Two
EMNCs
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Main Predictors & Predictions
H1: For AMNCs, regulative distance (H1a), cognitive distance (H1b),
and normative distance (H1c) are negatively related to ownership
position.
H2: For EMNCs, regulative distance (H2a), cognitive distance (H2b),
and normative distance (H2c) are positively related to ownership
position.
H3: For AMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional
distance on ownership position has the least influence.
H4: For EMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional
distance on ownership position is the strongest.
H5: Human capital development in an EMNC’s home country,
including skilled labor (H5a) and innovative capacity (H5b), decreases
the influence of institutional distance.
H6: The global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country, including
internet usage (H6a) and foreign market size (H6b) decreases the
influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership position.
H7: The historical connections of an EMNC’s home country to the host
developed market decrease the influence of institutional distance on an
EMNC’s ownership position in a developed market.
H8: An EMNC’s market leading position decreases the influence of
institutional distance on its ownership position in a developed market.
H9: An EMNC’s international presence decreases the influence of
institutional distance on its ownership position in a developed market.
H10: Media coverage of an EMNC in a developed market decreases the
influence of institutional distance on its ownership position in a
developed market.
H11: An EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market decreases the
influence of institutional distance on its ownership position in a

Result
H1b & c are supported

Not supported

Supported
Not supported
H5a is supported for regulative and
normative distance but not supported for
cognitive distance; H5b is not supported.
The opposite effects are found for H6a:
internet usage strengthens the influences
of institutional distance on EMNCs'
ownership. No support is found for H6b.
Partially supported by the moderation
effect of language distance on the
association between cognitive distance
and ownership position.
Not supported
Not supported
Supported for normative distance.

Not supported

developed market.
H12a: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a greater
ownership position have better firm performance.
H12b: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a lower
ownership position have better firm performance.

Higher ownership position leads to better
sales growth
Not supported
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Figure 1
A Conceptual Framework of EMNC’s Competitive Disadvantages in a Developed Market

EMNC’s Home
and Host market
• Institutional
distance between
emerging and
advanced markets

Competitive
Disadvantages
• Challenges to
establish
legitimacy in a
developed market
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Entry Strategy
• Ownership
position in the
cross-border
mergers &
acquisitions in a
developed market

Figure 2
Normative Distance and Ownership Position for AMNCs and EMNCs
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Figure 3
Skilled Labor in EMNCs’ Home Country and Regulative Distance
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Figure 4
Innovation Capacity in EMNCs’ Home Country and Cognitive Distance
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Figure 5
Skilled Labor in EMNCs’ Home Country and Normative Distance
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Figure 6
The Extent of Internet Usage in EMNCs’ Home Country and Regulative Distance
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Figure 7
The Foreign Market Size in EMNCs’ Home Country and Regulative Distance
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Figure 8
The Extent of Internet Usage in EMNCs’ Home Country and Cognitive Distance
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Figure 9
The Extent of Internet Usage in EMNCs’ Home Country and Normative Distance
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Figure 10
The Extent of Language Distance from EMNCs’ Home Country to the U.S. and Cognitive
Distance
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Figure 11
The Extent of EMNCs’ Media Coverage and Normative Distance
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